Summary
During the last 15 years, the process industries have made dramatic
improvements in occupational safety. Recordable injury rates have dropped by
close to an order of magnitude (Pitlblado 2008). Accurate information
pertaining to progress in process safety in the same time period is not
available. However, it is likely that improvements in process safety are not
nearly so great (Sutton 2010).
From its beginnings in the late 1980s and early 1990s, hazards analysis has
been a key item in all process safety programs. After all, if hazards are not
identified, they cannot be remediated. Of the various hazards-analysis
techniques, the Hazard and Operability Method (HAZOP) has probably gained the
greatest acceptance. Therefore, if the process industries are to achieve the
same levels of success in process safety as they have in occupational-safety
improvements, the effective use of HAZOPs is probably going to be of central
importance.
This paper discusses some of the cognitive, social, organizational, and
procedural factors that limit the effectiveness of projects in general and of
HAZOPs in particular. From this discussion, insights can be developed that can
provide ideas for improving the HAZOP process and process-safety-management
systems in general.
© 2010. Society of Petroleum Engineers
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History
- Original manuscript received:
31 December 2008
- Meeting paper published:
24 March 2009
- Revised manuscript received:
26 June 2009
- Manuscript approved:
18 September 2009
- Published online:
10 June 2010
- Version of record:
10 June 2010