Exclusive Content

IPIECA Strives To Boost Industry’s Environmental, Social Performance

Published September 23, 2013

As an introduction to the IPIECA, what follows is an interview with executive director Brian Sullivan.

What is IPIECA?

We are a global oil and gas industry association that works with our members to improve the environmental and social performance of the industry. We have a wide membership which includes 36 individual companies, who together are responsible for more than half of the world’s oil output, as well as 16 associations, forming a network that represent more than 400 oil and gas companies.

Why was IPIECA formed?

IPIECA has been around for almost 40 years. Back in 1974, when the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) was created, industry was asked to identify central points of contact. The petroleum industry was one of the first to act on this request, and, although there were already existing national and international associations concerned wholly or partially with environmental affairs, none of them covered all petroleum operations in a global context. As a result, in March 1974, IPIECA was established as the channel through which all parts of the industry could efficiently communicate with UNEP and subsequently with other related intergovernmental agencies involved in the implementation of the system-wide environment program.

Today, we remain the only global association involving both the upstream and downstream oil and gas industry on environmental and social issues and continue to be the industry’s principal channel of communication with the UN.

What does IPIECA do?

IPIECA provides leadership on environmental and social issues for the oil and gas industry by enabling performance improvements by developing, sharing, and promoting good practices and solutions, informing global policy and external stakeholders on relevant issues, and anticipating challenges for the industry by scanning and assessing emerging issues and developing actions.

Through IPIECA, our members work together to address a wide range of issues within three broad themes: climate and energy, the environment, and social responsibility. Specifically, we run working groups made up of around 500 representatives from our member companies focusing on issues including biodiversity, climate change, health, oil-spill preparedness, operations and fuels, sustainability reporting, social responsibility, and water. These individuals volunteer their time to progress industry knowledge and performance on these key sustainability issues. Furthermore we engage with external initiatives on behalf of the industry such as the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), CDP (formerly the Carbon Disclosure Project), the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC) and many more. We also use our consultative status with the UN to represent the industry at the global level on environmental and social issues.

What does your name stand for?

One of the enduring legacies of our ’70s birth, or perhaps burden depending on how you look at it, is our name, IPIECA. Originally standing for the somewhat lengthy, International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association, from 2008, in recognition of the addition of social issues to our work program, we dropped the full title and became known simply as IPIECA, the global oil and gas industry association for environmental and social issues.

What have been your key achievements over the past couple of years?

There are many, but I’ll just highlight a few here, including our ongoing work on water management, business and human rights, oil spill response and sustainability reporting, as well as our input into the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development (also known as Rio+20).

The IPIECA Water-Management Framework. IPIECA launched a new onshore Water management framework at World Water Week 2013 in Stockholm on 3 September 2013. Designed to enable oil and gas companies to prioritize and address key water management issues, foster best practice, and standardize data collection, the framework also provides a platform for broad external communication of achievements, goals and progress.

While the oil and gas sector consumes lower volumes of water than many other global industries, it remains a significant user, and recognizes the need for responsible management of water resources as a contribution to global sustainability efforts. To help companies across the industry address and respond to water management challenges, this framework has been developed to provide a practical cyclical process of planning, implementation, evaluation, and management review.

The Business and Human Rights Project. As SPE members know, the oil and gas industry operates in complex environments where human-rights issues are a central concern. In June 2011, IPIECA launched a 3-year project to provide members with a forum for sharing good practice on human rights due diligence and grievance mechanisms and to help oil and gas companies implement new and emerging international guidance on business and human rights.

This project, building on a decade of activity by IPIECA on business and human rights, focuses on peer learning, industry guidance, and participation in external initiatives. During the last 2 years, we have launched a number of publications designed to enhance the capability of oil and gas companies to manage human rights issues and their impacts in business operations including:

  • Human Rights Due Diligence Process—A Practical Guide to Implementation for Oil and Gas Companies.
  • Operational Level Grievance Mechanisms—IPIECA Good Practice Survey.
  • Human Rights Training Tool (Third Edition)
  • Guide on Integrating Human Rights Into Impact Assessment in the Oil and Gas Industry.
IPIECA-Fig1

Fig. 1

The Global Initiative: Partnership for Enhanced Oil Spill Response. The Global Initiative (GI) program was established in 1996 by IPIECA and the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and today continues to expand its work on reducing global oil spill risk in priority locations. The program helps countries to develop national structures and capability for oil spill preparedness and response. In recent years, the GI has continued to build its existing programs in the Mediterranean, Caspian, Black Sea, and central Eurasia and west, central, and southern Africa, as well as expand into new regions including southeast Asia and China (Fig. 1). We are also currently scoping the potential for a specific program in East Africa.

Rio+20. At the United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, ‘Rio+20’, held in June 2012 in Rio de Janeiro, world leaders joined 50,000 representatives from governments, the private sector, NGOs, and other groups to discuss how to reduce poverty, advance social equity, and protect the environment on an ever more crowded planet.

Fig. 2

IPIECA coordinated the oil and gas industry’s contribution to Rio+20 and the wider preparatory process leading up to it. From a process that began in June 2010, a set of messages and fact sheets were developed, demonstrating the industry’s commitment to sustainable development and describing how further goals can be achieved in the future. The oil and gas industry messages were presented at Rio+20 during an IPIECA session at the Business Action for Sustainable Development (BASD) Business Day. A panel (Fig. 2) offered a number of examples of how the industry is working to meet the challenge of providing essential fuels in ways that are environmentally and socially responsible.

Sustainability Reporting. Oil and gas companies have been among the pioneers of sustainability reporting and have provided leading examples of good reporting practices since the mid-1990s. In 2011 IPIECA, together with the American Petroleum Institute (API), and the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP) issued the second edition of the Oil and gas industry guidance on voluntary sustainability reporting. The Guidance provides a flexible framework which enables companies to effectively communicate material impacts to their stakeholders. IPIECA is now working to ensure that the Guidance remains up to date with progressing industry and external trends and developments, and will be releasing a 2014 edition with a number of revised and new indicators.

What’s next?

As well as maintaining and building on our existing work programs, IPIECA is continually considering emerging issues to add to our portfolio. Recent additions include examining the social dimensions of gas from shale projects; deliverables will include peer-learning workshops and guidance on managing community issues unique to shale gas development. Later in the year, we will be holding a workshop looking at the role of short-lived climate forcers in climate-change-mitigation strategies. Publications still to come in 2013 include guidance on mercury-emissions management, waste management and remediation, as well as an online compendium of energy efficiency practices for operations, which aims to improve industry knowledge of available measures.

Next year, we reach an important milestone; IPIECA will celebrate 40 years of championing best practice on environmental and social issues across the global oil and gas industry. Our anniversary celebrations will include a conference and gala dinner in London to showcase how IPIECA has harnessed the power of partnership to address key environmental and social challenges around the world. Building on the progress that has been made over the past 40 years, the conference will look ahead to what more can be achieved through IPIECA’s leadership in the 10 years to 2024, when we will celebrate our 50th anniversary. The event will feature high-level experts and industry leaders from around the world as speakers and will include interactive discussions among participants to help develop a strong vision for the future.

Learn more about IPIECA here.

 

Brian Sullivan joined IPIECA as the executive director in 2011 following a 23-year career with BP. He graduated in metallurgy and materials science from Imperial College London and was recruited into BP’s Refining and Marketing international graduate program in 1986. Over the course of 23 years, his career included assignments in London, Copenhagen, Budapest, Athens, and Johannesburg and business experience in more than 60 countries. During his time with BP, he has had a varied career of technical, commercial, financial, and leadership roles across the downstream value chain, including crude and products trading, marine fuels, lubricants, and alternative energy.

 

The Business of Kidnapping

Published September 16, 2013

Kidnapping is a serious and real threat when you travel to emerging markets and high-risk parts of the world. Criminals generate large profits and operate like a business. Kidnappers not only target executives for ransom or political gain, but also Western business associates from lucrative industries including oil and gas.

The number of reported kidnapping cases continues to grow each year. According to industry experts, there has been a dramatic increase in reported kidnappings in high-risk countries from 2012 through the first six months of 2013. The current top high-risk countries are Nigeria and Mexico. Mexico had 555 reported kidnappings between January and April 2013 compared with 417 incidents during the same time period last year. Yemen also placed particularly high on the list this year as its government remains unable to enforce its justice system or any authority.

Kidnapping can describe a wide spectrum of scenarios. Aside from the most common form of abduction, kidnap for ransom, criminals also engage in express (lightning) kidnappings where victims are temporarily detained and their bank accounts drained through coerced bank transactions. More disturbingly, kidnappers have begun abducting individuals and selling them to terrorist organizations who use the victims for political gain. Your company cannot afford to put you, the most precious commodity, in a vulnerable position.

Kidnappers look for easy targets. They observe and prey on travelers who create patterns and habits such as taking the same routes to and from work. Cell phone records, travel itineraries, and background information are often collected in dangerous countries with help from telephone service providers and corrupt local law enforcement. Something as simple as a tweet or Facebook post from a corporate employee or family member mentioning your whereabouts can lead to an attack.

The following simple steps can be taken to deter kidnapping while traveling internationally:

  • Establish a crisis-management plan with your company before traveling abroad
  • Learn about the geopolitical situation in the region you are traveling to
  • Employ security professionals who can provide security-risk analysis and country-specific response plans before travel
  • Conduct comprehensive due diligence on the individuals and companies you will be meeting with
  • Arrange for qualified security to pick you up from the airport and provide secure transportation throughout your travels
  • Maintain consistent communication with your colleagues while overseas
  • Remain alert and aware of your surroundings while traveling abroad

It’s no secret the oil and gas industry is high-risk. You must travel to unstable and often third-world regions in order to maintain and expand your business. Talk to experienced professionals and conduct the necessary research and planning before traveling overseas. Safety is your No. 1 priority.

James Reese

James Reese

Creating a Common Safety Culture

Published September 9, 2013

Most people who work in the oil and gas industry know what a “permit to work” is. A blue permit indicates that it covers “cold” work—work with no potential to create a naked flame, hot surface, spark, or explosion. Having a permit ensures that the job site is safe for the team to do its work, that the team understands the potential risks of the work it is planning to do, and that it agrees to put suitable controls in place.

I spoke recently at the Piper 25 Conference, a 3-day event held in Aberdeen to mark the 25th anniversary of the Piper Alpha disaster that killed 167 people on board the oil platform in the North Sea. On display at the conference was a copy of Cold Work Permit 23434. The tattered paper was found in the accommodation module that was recovered from the seabed. The permit was for the replacement of a relief valve on the B condensate pump. It was this work that was at the heart of the initial release and explosion when the operators tried to start the pump even though it was not ready. The rest, tragically, is history.

It begs an obvious question and a supplementary one: Could something similar happen again, and, if so, can we do anything to reduce the chances of it happening?

The oil and gas industry has made huge advances in safety management over the past 25 years. The goal-setting regime, safety cases, and verification schemes have been hugely beneficial.

We have greater collaboration and everyone now talks about safety as being important and most people genuinely believe it. However, the industry is still experiencing too many serious events that, if we are unlucky, could easily result in another tragedy.

We are a global industry in which good practices are shared across our operations. The loss of life in any country has to be as unacceptable as a tragedy on our own doorstep.

Over the past 25 years since Piper Alpha, there have been more than 25 multifatality accidents in our industry. In June, two people died in an accident on a gas platform in the Dutch sector of the North Sea. Last year, three died in an explosion in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) and 11 died in the Deepwater Horizon explosion in the GOM in 2010.

Can we do anything to make these situations less likely? Are we controlling the risks to our people in a joined-up way?

Recommendation 67 of Lord Cullen’s Report on the Piper Alpha disaster called on the industry to institute common systems for alarms and warning lights. Unfortunately, at the time, the industry could not reach this position voluntarily and legislation was needed to create new regulations.

Surely that would not happen today because we have a unified approach with strong, clear leadership across the industry that understands the benefit of common systems and approaches and are not hung up on insisting that only their corporate systems will do. We are happy to agree on common standards for survival training, we have a common system for tracking people traveling offshore, and we have agreed on standards for use of personal locator beacons on helicopter flights.

These are all good. But we are not so good at agreeing to common standards in other areas, such as work control, isolation standards, risk assessment, and safety observation programs. We are good at creating guidelines, but are reluctant to make any hard-and-fast safety rules for the step change “safety club” because few clubs allow membership to choose which rules to follow.

Why not introduce a common permit to work? A common job safety assessment? Common observation programs? Common isolation standards? What a signal it would send to the offshore workforce about our genuine commitment to their safety.

Who Gets the Learning?

More contractor personnel get hurt offshore than operator personnel because there are more of them and fewer work in offices or control rooms. So, when an accident happens and a contract worker is injured, you might think that the contractor company has at least as much to learn as anyone else; yet, often the company does not hear about the accident straight away, is refused access to participate in the investigation, and does not see the findings unless the operator is faulting the contractor.

The right to be informed of any and all accidents, the right to participate in investigations, and the right to see all findings should be part of the industry’s standard contracting terms. We all have a legal duty to take care of our employees and a legal obligation to cooperate in ensuring the safety of others affected by our activities. So, it is not unreasonable to check the work site where our staff may be working, yet many operators take offense at being asked to demonstrate workplace safety.

Leadership Is the Key

So, what can we do about this?

Although we can have better systems, more competent people, higher standards, and better training, the key and common ingredient is leadership.

There are hundreds of books on leadership and a thousand different models—each one has merits, and many have evidence to support them. So, if we cannot get a common idea of leadership, what is the chance of obtaining a common idea of safety leadership?

Leadership shapes culture, culture shapes behavior, and poor behavior is the common factor that can undermine competent people, good design, and strong processes.

It comes down to three basic building blocks.

Things you need to know. A safety leader needs to be informed about what is happening in the business and be aware of any and all accidents and near misses. To know these things, you need to ask and check—all the time. You need to know the bad news, the concerns, and the complaints and have a culture that does not filter these out.

You also need to know the risks faced by your people, as well as contractors, subcontractors, vendors, and other specialists. You need to know that all of these people are competent. You need to know that risk controls are in place and are effective. And you also need to know that people will do the right thing in an emergency.

Things you need to say and not say. It is said that the primary role of leadership is about setting the tone. It is more than that; it is about repeatedly providing clear and direct messages that reinforce a commitment to safety. Being clear is far from easy—messages need to be repeated, received, credible, and not drowned out or undermined.

Things you need to do and not do. Actions need to match the good words. People see actions—often they do not hear the words. If actions do not match the words, then credibility disappears in an instant. Safety leaders need to be aware that their actions, and sometimes their inactions, are visible and send a bigger message than all the words combined.

Bob Keiller became chief executive officer (CEO) of the John Wood Group in November 2012. Previously, he was CEO of Wood Group PSN and CEO of Production Services Network before its acquisition by Wood Group. He has also served as chairman of the Offshore Contractors Association, the UK Helicopter Issues Task Group, the Entrepreneurial Exchange, and cochairman of Oil and Gas UK. Awarded the Aberdeen Entrepreneur of the Year in 2006 and 2008, he was also named Scottish Businessman of the Year in 2007 and Grampian Industrialist of the Year in 2008. Keiller received a master of engineering degree from Heriot-Watt University and is a chartered engineer.

A Social License To Operate: Overcoming the Culture Clash

Published August 30, 2013

The takeover of a public park in Turkey to build a shopping mall. The raising of the public bus fare in Brazil. The government closing Greece’s major newspaper. What do these events have in common with the Keystone XL pipeline proposal? The authorities in these situations made a decision to impose a project solution without talking with the people who would be affected by the decision.

The Turkish government decided to take over a small public park to build a shopping mall without seeking input/feedback from the community. In Brazil, raising the bus fares (mostly affecting poor people) seemed to be a reasonable approach to raise revenues for the upcoming 2016 Summer Olympic Games. In Greece, the shutdown of the government newspaper and the firing of a couple of dozen workers were done to demonstrate austerity to the European Union.

In the United States, the route of the Keystone pipeline, proposed to carry tar sand oil from Alberta, Canada, to Houston for refining, was planned to run across Nebraska’s Ogallala aquifer and sandhills, which are sacred cultural icons.

The problem? These decisions were made from the top-down on the basis of internal considerations, revealing a lack of capacity for dealing with emerging social realities across the globe. The decision makers neglected to understand that citizen engagement is a key to business success in today’s volatile world, where people are insisting on managing, predicting, and controlling their environments.

Small acts that seem inconsequential to government and industry can spark revolts and reactions that, in the cases of Turkey, Brazil, and Greece, have the potential to bring down the governments. The Keystone project could be lost because of the groundswell against the project stimulated by the routing mistake.

Ten years ago, in a more formally structured world, these decisions would not have mattered. These days, when citizen resistance and mobilization are becoming routine and global, these decisions matter.

The JKA (James Kent Associates) Group has been tracking this emerging global trend for 30 years and has termed it “citizen-based stewardship.” It refers to citizens who claim ownership of geographic places and take it upon themselves, with or without government or corporate partners, to ensure that their families and communities are healthy and safe.

Transmission line corridors, alternative energy sites, and the proliferation of oil and gas development have improved our energy outlook, but have also affected people across the US. In particular, the hydrofracturing of wells for natural gas production has caused concerns in recent years. It is not difficult for a concerned public to find cause for alarm. The fracturing issue has now fused in national perception and become widespread throughout hydrofracturing areas, while also spreading turmoil to more traditional oil and gas activities.

Resistance has developed because much of the hydrofracturing is being done in geographic areas where citizens are not familiar with fossil fuel development. Their cultural experience and practices have done little to prepare them for the onslaught of drilling activity. When people have no mechanism in their daily lives to deal with intrusive change, their only avenue for relief is reaction and resistance. Studies such as the one cited earlier add fuel to the fire when the development company has no citizen connections or engagements to rely on for interpretation of the findings. With no mechanism for communicating, the company is vulnerable not only to local resistance, but also to national groups that will use these studies to benefit their causes.

The top-down approach to project design is still in place. Projects are designed by engineers from locations miles away from the site. It is common practice to expend extensive engineering effort early in a project during the front-end engineering and design (FEED) phase. This design process leads to only the technical issues being addressed. The engineering culture wants the design firmly in place, with all the technical details worked out, before going public for review.

Companies prefer to hold their cards close to their chests to avoid revealing information to residents who they fear could stimulate conflict. For example, the people who negotiate the rights-of-way for projects have an incentive to keep things quiet while they interact with landowners. Public relations personnel recognize that failure to be transparent invites suspicion and mistrust, yet they are constrained by corporate cultures that emphasize control of the development process.

Such approaches are no longer productive or profitable. Corporate neglect of citizen engagement is a costly affair for everyone.

Clash of Two Cultures

The situations described illustrate cultural clashes between the communities’ horizontally organized systems vs. the corporations’ vertically organized authority—clashes of perceptions and practices. The community is oriented to caretaking and survival, and the industry is oriented to economic gain.

In this article, we show that the cultural clash is not inevitable. The two systems must come into harmony if the oil and gas industry is to remain productive and profitable. When dealing with communities, it is essential to recognize that the adage “one size fits all” is not applicable. Just as each project is technically different, each community is different—with different histories, beliefs, and issues.

In any cultural system, life is predictable through routines and language. As change occurs, people need time to adjust within their cultural settings. People continually deal with emerging issues and solve them. It is when there is intrusion, without recognition of how the culture has previously handled change, that projects are at risk.

The old (traditional) approach is to design in isolation, propose the design, and then defend it against opposition. This approach is depicted as a wedge into the community, fostering disruption and mistrust, and creating local issues. If these issues go unresolved, they offer outside groups the opportunity to take advantage of unresolved citizen issues in the pursuit of their own agendas, leading to formal opposition groups such as occurred with the Keystone XL pipeline project.

The new model gives residents a voice and emotional ownership, which, in turn, gives the company a social license to operate. If intentional efforts are made to resolve legitimate citizen issues early in the design stage and to optimize the local benefits of a project, citizen ownership through absorption will serve as a buffer for the project against outside forces.

Preventing the Escalation of Emerging Issues

The key to understanding culture from a practical point is to learn about the issues that are currently present in the community or that the project may create. Community issues do not begin as uncontrollable events that are guaranteed to stop projects. Instead, they emerge as legitimate questions that citizens have about a proposed project.

It is not the case that the local community has formed a steadfast or universal opinion. Rather, people are simply seeking answers to basic questions, including: What will this project do to my property value? Will it increase traffic? How will it affect air and water quality? How many people will be hired locally? Will the project enhance the growth of local businesses? Will community- based training programs or college curriculums be offered to prepare our citizens and youth for employment and advancement opportunities? Will the company ensure local benefits from the project, such as reduced electric rates? Will there be assistance for establishing businesses to service the project?

When the basic questions are not addressed, emerging issues can easily escalate to actual ones. By this point, people have formed their own opinions, and the community dialogue changes from seeking information to developing positions. The questions turn to negative statements, such as: This project will ruin our property values. The traffic and noise from this project will be unbearable. Children and seniors with asthma will suffer, and the incidence of cancer will increase. They will not be contracting or hiring locally. Local businesses will not benefit from this project and may actually lose revenue. The skills necessary for employment are beyond most of our citizens. The company just wants to exploit our community for profits.

These sentiments may not be based on facts, but, without community engagement, perception becomes reality.

If the actual issues are not addressed effectively, events will only become worse. Community opposition is often joined by opportunistic ideological groups, followed by political positioning. Polarized positions are taken toward the project, and the opposition quickly moves it into a disruption. By this point, the project proponent has virtually lost the ability to resolve the individual and community issues. The issues that could have been resolved, had the citizens been engaged in the early phases, are taken over by outside forces who oppose development at anytime, anywhere.

The Solution: The Social Ecology Approach

The social ecology approach involves attention to the community on three concepts: a descriptive approach for understanding informal networks and their routines; understanding human geography, or the ways that residents relate to their neighborhood and community areas; and issue management, which creates alignment between citizen interests and company interests. Social ecology is a science of community based on cultural processes operating in any geographic area or in any resource company.

The following five rules help in gaining an understanding of local cultural issues:

  1. You, as a project proponent and an outsider and guest of the community, have a responsibility to learn about the community before acting.
  2. People know more about their environment than anyone else. It is the job of the project manager to bring forward this knowledge and perception to make use of it.
  3. The project proponent must ensure that citizens can predict, control, and manage changes in their environment so that the effects of the project are absorbed into the fabric of the community and the benefits are optimized.
  4. People trust day-to-day and face-to-face communication, which is essential if the project is going to fit the community.
  5. Whoever understands the human and physical geography that creates the community’s sense of place controls the project outcome.

Procedures to implement the five rules of culture change are:

  • Contact and engage with citizens early to avoid surprises. Community engagement must be at parity with technical disciplines in tactical and strategic project decision making. For example, extensive technical work during FEED should be accompanied by extensive community engagement.
  • The objective of early engagement with the community should be learning. Learn the informal networks of a community and its communication patterns as the basis for engagement. Learn the language that people use to communicate on a routine basis and use that in project development language.
  • Engage the affected people directly. Do not rely on formal groups or stakeholders in understanding community interests. Do not use public meetings as a means of initial citizen contact. Use the gathering places of a community to foster effective project communication and as a means to become an insider to the culture.
  • Understand human geographic mapping systems that reflect cultural boundaries, or the ways that people identify and relate with their landscape, to foster responsive siting of facility and corridor projects.
  • Deal with citizen issues at the emerging stage of development when the costs of time and resources are lowest, rather than allowing issues to reach the disruptive stages.
  • Make use of local company staff, when possible, at the design and implementation stages and provide management support in assisting them to create an approach from the bottom to the top.

Conclusion

The social risk to project success has become too great for the oil and gas industry not to recognize formally and systematically act upon the underlying causes of how citizens’ participation often moves from support to active opposition. Whether the project is on public or private land, it deserves this level of attention.

Because community relations are now linked to project success, upfront engineering should include upfront community assessment and the establishment of an informal word-of-mouth communication system. Knowing about culture and its influences on citizen behavior presents a creative and successful way for industry leaders to steer their projects around pitfalls and other surprises that cause delays or stop projects altogether.

Understanding the culture of a community facilitates collaboration in a manner that directly benefits the citizens and keeps a project on schedule, saving time and money. The true currency of the present and future is the sustained goodwill that a project creates and maintains with the communities it affects.

Experiments on Large-Scale Fires Reveal Benefit of Greater Water Deluge

Published August 17, 2013

A series of 56 large-scale fire experiments in the range of 40–120 MW has been carried out in a generic offshore module. The effect of deluge fire-water application has been measured for different setups. Both deluge nozzle type and water-application rate have been varied in the experiments.

Introduction

The use of water-spray systems for firefighting is standard for most offshore oil and gas intallations. The requirements to and guidelines for control and mitigation of fires are stated in International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 13702, Petroleum and Natural Gas Industries—Control and Mitigation of Fires and Explosions on Offshore Production Installations—Requirements and Guidelines. Appendix C in ISO 13702 lists the recommended fire-water-­application rates for areas and rooms on an oil- or gas-­production installation. Typically, the minimum recommended water-­application rate is listed as 10 (L/min)/m². NORSOK Standard S-001, applicable for installations on the Norwegian continental shelf, states that the effect of deluge may be taken into account for process equipment and piping, provided that there is proper documentation of the fire-water effect (and that there are requirements to the reliability of the fire-water system).

In order to document the effect of the recommended fire-water-application rate, a set of full-scale fire experiments with application of fire water was carried out at SINTEF NBL.

Background

Today’s design of oil- or gas-production installations includes deluge-fire-­water systems as standard. These are costly and may require extensive maintenance. Despite the costs involved, little knowledge is available on the actual effect of fire-water systems under different operating conditions.

Appendix C in ISO 13702 recommends a typical water-application rate of 10 (L/min)/m². National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 15: Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire Protection recommends a design objective for control of burning of not less than 20 (L/min)/m². NORSOK S-001 refers to NFPA 15 but prescribes 10 (L/min)/m² for process areas and equipment surfaces and 20 (L/min)/m² for the wellhead area. American Petroleum Institute (API) 2030, Guidelines for Application of Water Spray Systems for Fire Protection in the Petroleum Industry, prescribes 20 (L/min)/m² where pumps are present and 10 (L/min)/m² for pipe racks and piping. To what extent do these water-­application rates actually affect the fire?

Quantification of Fire Loads

The characteristics of a fire are not trivial to measure. Different ways of measuring fire characteristics include

  • Ability to extinguish fire
  • Total heat-release rate (HRRtot), kW
  • Convective heat-release rate (HRRcon), kW
  • Total flame volume, m³
  • Maximum flame temperature, °C, K
  • Flame volume above a defined temperature (e.g., V at >1000°C), m³
  • Maximum local heat fluxes, kW/m²
  • Maximum global heat fluxes, kW/m²
  • Flame volume above a defined heat flux (e.g., V at >250 kW/m²), m³
  • Surface emissive power of a flame, kW/m²
  • Temperature or temperature rise of flame-exposed objects, °C, K; or °C/s, K/s
  • Smoke production, m³/s, g/s

In a full-scale field experiment, many of these parameters are difficult or impracticable to measure. How­ever, most of them are possible to derive from fire simulations using suitable software.

Experimental Setup

The 56 fires were in the range of 40–120 MW. The experiments were carried out in a 15×10×10-m generic process module (Fig. 1). 

Experimental-test rig.

The process module was equipped with nearly 200 thermocouples, 100 of which measured gas temperature. The rest measured temperature of equipment, structure, and exhaust gas.

Parameter variations addressed during the experiments were

  • Hydrocarbon media (propane, diesel)
  • Hydrocarbon leak rate (1 kg/s, 3 kg/s)
  • Leakage location
  • Leakage direction
  • Water-application device (medium-velocity nozzles, high-velocity nozzles, high-capacity nozzles, and monitors)
  • Water-application rate [10 (L/min)/m², 20 (L/min)/m²]
  • Enclosure
  • Wind
  • Additives

Pictures of a 3-kg/s diesel-spray fire before and after activated deluge can be seen in Fig. 2. 

Pictures of a 3-kg/s diesel-spray fire before (left) and after (right) deluge activation.

Results

Here the fire-water effects are presented at a semiquantitative level on the basis of measured values before and after deluge water application.

The effect on maximum gas temperature is measured as K/K as an average of the 10 thermocouples with the highest readings. The effect on isotemperature volumes is a qualitative assessment based on ratios calculated as m³/m³ for volumes with temperatures higher than 1100 and 1000°C. The effect on isoheat-flux volumes is a qualitative assessment based on ratios calculated as m³/m³ for heat-flux levels larger than 250, 200, and 150 kW/m². The effect on external radiation level is based on ratios of heat flux derived from simulations.

A “negligible” effect indicates a factor of 0.95–1.00. “Small” indicates a ­factor of 0.80–0.95. “Clear” indicates a factor of 0.50–0.80. “Significant” indicates a factor lower than 0.50. The effects are presented in Table 1 for situations with little or no wind.

Comments and Discussion

As for equipment cooling, the experimental results vary to a large degree, from good effect to no effect. For jet fires, deluge water has no effect on the temperature in the hotspot of the flame. Results also vary with the flame shape and location of deluge nozzles.

It is not possible to conclude whether medium-velocity deluge nozzles or high-velocity deluge nozzles should be preferred. In general, medium-velocity nozzles seem to have their strength in reducing isoheat-flux volumes and external radiation. Isoheat-flux volumes are important because they are indirect measurements of heat-flux exposure of equipment and structure, possibly affecting the probability of escalation. High-­velocity nozzles seem to have their strength in equipment cooling and during windy conditions. As for wind, the differences in effects are significant in favor of high-velocity nozzles in the wind-speed range of 2–10 m/s, most likely because of higher nozzle discharge velocity.

In retrospect, the experiments would benefit from a narrower range of parameter variation and better-planned placement of thermocouples.

Deluge Water-Droplet Size

It would be of great interest to study the effect of an actual deluge system design from simulations. To allow for such simulations, one has to have an idea of water-droplet size, distribution, and velocity. Deluge water-droplet size and velocity have often been measured by phase Doppler anemometry (PDA). However, PDA has some weaknesses when it comes to measurement of nonspherical droplets. Statoil, therefore, is sponsoring a doctorate-level study at Telemark University College to develop a method for classification of deluge water droplets by photometry.

Summary and Conclusion

A total of 56 large-scale fire experiments with fire-water application have been conducted, with a wide range of parameter variation. The main findings are

  • Deluge-water application has better effect on liquid-spray fires than on gas-jet fires.
  • A deluge water-application rate of 10 (L/min)/m² will have negligible or little effect on the highest gas temperature in the fire.
  • A deluge water-application rate of 20 (L/min)/m² has a documented more-favorable effect than an application rate of 10 (L/min)/m².
  • For gas-jet fires, the flame-hotspot temperature will persist, independent of deluge configuration.
  • The choice of medium-velocity or high-velocity deluge nozzles depends on the fire scenario.
  • Medium-velocity nozzles have their strength in reducing heat fluxes and isoheat-flux volumes, thereby reducing the amount of equipment and structure exposed to high radiation load.
  • High-velocity nozzles have their strength in equipment-cooling ability and a lower vulnerability to wind.

This article, written by Editorial Manager Adam Wilson, contains highlights of paper SPE 164973, “The Effect of Deluge Spray Systems on Large-Scale Fires,” by Stian Høiset and Eli Glittum, Statoil, prepared for the 2013 SPE European HSE Conference and Exhibition, London, 16–18 April. The paper has not been peer reviewed.

For a limited time, the complete paper is free to SPE members at www.spe.org/jpt.

Company’s Revised Approach to Safety Strives To Make Standards More Natural

Published August 16, 2013

ExxonMobil has traditionally used industry standards driven by the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to classify safety events on the basis of the treatment or restrictions provided. However, this treatment-based approach has limitations. With its focus on administrative reporting and incident-escalation management, the approach does not naturally resonate with workforce members to enable desired cultural changes. A hurt-based approach has been adopted to mitigate the limitations of the treatment-based approach.

Traditional Treatment-Based Approach

In the treatment-based approach to personnel safety, an incident, from the treatment or restrictions provided, is classified as a lost-time incident (LTI), restricted-work incident (RWI), medical-­treatment incident (MTI), first aid, no treatment, near miss, or unsafe act/unsafe condition. These are usually represented by the traditional safety pyramid (Fig. 1).

Treatment-based safety pyramid.

Benefits of this approach include

  • It provides historical metrics common across multiple industries.
  • It allows comparisons on a similar basis.
  • It is consistent with many government/regulatory-agency reporting requirements.

However, this approach also has significant limitations:

  •  It is not consistently descriptive of actual injury severity; for example, body damage such as a minor laceration, a sprained ankle, or a broken neck could each be correctly classified as an LTI, depending on the circumstances.
  • It does not have an integral potential injury severity; safety events with low actual consequence (e.g., minor hurt, near misses) are often overlooked or simply not reported.
  • It creates a blind spot relative to exposures for severe injuries by focusing solely on traditional safety metrics [e.g., total recordable incident rate (TRIR), LTI rate (LTIR)]; certain activities and activities managed by safety controls require greater exposure awareness.
  • It is not an enabler for a culture of caring; workers can perceive case-management priority to be about reducing the number of recordables (perhaps by minimizing treatment) and not about the elimination of all injuries.

Nobody Gets Hurt

The phrase “nobody gets hurt” was coined in 2000 and later adopted by ExxonMobil as the corporation’s safety vision for a workforce that believes all injuries are preventable and where all workers accept personal accountability for their own safety and are willing and able to intervene to ensure the safety of others. It was understood that progressing the vision would require long-term, visible commitment by safety leaders at all levels of the organization, from the executive office to the front line. It was understood that achieving the vision would be a journey, not a project or an initiative or a singular destination.

In May 2001, the new safety vision of Nobody Gets Hurt was discussed and an initiative was presented challenging the organization to achieve the vision as soon as possible. The objective was to eliminate all treatment-based incidents meeting the recording criteria for an injury or illness under OSHA recordkeeping requirements.

Management believed the primary concerns should always be the care for any injured person and the assessment of incidents to prevent future hurt. Unfortunately, some workers believed the most important question driving the case-­management process was “Is it a recordable or not?” This perception by some that safety was all about statistics was viewed as an obstacle to achieving the vision. A strategic navigational correction was needed in the journey to Nobody Gets Hurt to win over the workforce and enable the desired pervasive culture of safety.

Expectations of Safety Leadership

  • Safety leadership is not a task assigned to the safety department. Safety leadership is not a position or title reserved for senior management. Safety leadership is a value expected of every person within the workforce, whether employee or contractor. To move the journey toward a common safety vision, a few critical actions must be taken. These are ensuring that the leadership
  • Aligns with the vision
  • Believes the vision can be achieved
  • Personally and passionately commits to the vision
  • Sincerely promotes the vision to the workforce
  • Celebrates successes
  • From Compliance to Culture

An analogy of how a safety journey can progress is the evolution of seat-belt usage. Seat-belt use was not always regulated; older automobiles did not include them, and, if they did, they simply were not used (it was not in the culture). Once regulations were passed and it became against the law not to wear seat belts, people started wearing them out of compliance. People did not necessarily believe in seat belts; they simply used them to avoid the fines and penalties of noncompliance. Later, people realized that wearing seat belts had become a habit. People no longer had to decide consciously to wear seat belts each time they got into an automobile. Over time, some grew wiser and started wearing seat belts willingly; they now believed seat belts could save their lives in a traffic accident. Possibly, people started encouraging others to use them as well. Perhaps now people make sure their spouses, children, and guests always wear seat belts when in an automobile because that is simply the way things are done. That is a culture of safety.

Serious Injuries and Fatalities

A 2010 industry study found that traditional safety-pyramid principles were not driving elimination of serious injuries and fatalities (SIFs). Even though it is typical for many companies’ TRIR and LTIR to be trending downward, it is also very common for their fatal-­accident rates to be at a plateau or actually increasing. The idea that minor injuries could predict more-serious injuries is embedded in our culture; however, the study indicates that a reduction of injuries at the bottom of the pyramid does not correspond to a proportionate reduction of SIFs. This is because not all injuries have SIF potential. The study found that a relatively small subset, approximately 20%, of all incidents had the potential to be an SIF. This finding challenged the traditional thinking that focusing on eliminating incidents in general would ultimately reduce the more-severe injuries at the top of the pyramid.

The majority of injuries simply do not have the potential to become high-consequence incidents regardless of the circumstances surrounding the safety event. This is because underlying causes and factors for SIFs are different from those for less-serious injuries. SIFs are disproportionately related to certain activities (e.g., working at height, crane and lifting operations, man/machine interface) and to activities managed by certain safety controls (e.g., lock-out/tag-out, confined-space entry, energy isolation). Ensuring workforce awareness of the increased exposures generated by these types of work activities is critical in the elimination of SIFs.

Drivers for the Hurt-Based Approach

The hurt-based approach to safety was approved and implemented across all of ExxonMobil’s upstream companies effective January 2012. Critical drivers to adoption included

  • A proven 6-year history in ExxonMobil Drilling, showing improvements across all levels of the pyramid, including SIFs
  • Integral assessment of potential injury severity
  • Consistent description of actual injury severity
  • Resonance with workers to enable the desired safety culture based on caring for people
  • Natural safety language in most, if not all, global cultures—protect family, prevent injuries

A graphical analysis of the rate of workers hurt is provided in Fig. 2.

ExxonMobil Drilling: rate of workforce hurt, 2003–11.

From a high of 6.50 in 2004 to a low of 1.49 in 2011, Drilling’s total hurt incident rate (THIR) improved such that five fewer people were getting hurt for every 200,000 exposure-hours.

 

A graph of ExxonMobil Drilling’s serious injuries and fatalities on both an actual and a potential basis is shown in Fig. 3.

Potential vs. actual hurt.

The rate of actual high-­consequence safety events (SIFs) decreased, while incidents with high consequence potential decreased significantly.

Methodology and Process

In implementing the hurt-based approach across ExxonMobil’s upstream companies, slight modifications were made to the severity scale. These new hurt-based severity levels are shown in Fig. 4

ExxonMobil upstream hurt-based severity scale.

along with examples of the physical body damage typical of each level. The “Duration” column provides an additional resource to assist in determining the hurt level of incidents on the basis of the amount of time the injured person takes to return to normal duties without any decrease in work effectiveness or efficiency.

The process for determining the actual hurt level (AHL) of an incident is to contrast the actual physical effect, injury, or illness to a person against the hurt-based severity levels (Fig. 4) and assign an AHL. The determination of potential hurt level (PHL) is a more structured process but is still very simple. For PHL determination, the basic process is to

  • Use the actual safety event as it occurred (do not speculate on what could have happened at this point)
  • Use the actual hazards that existed at the time of the event (do not add fictional or additional hazards)
  • Determine any applicable pre-event mitigations in place at the time of the event
  • Discuss feasible-but-reasonable scenarios that would result in the highest risk to people, and consider to what level the pre-event mitigations in place would have reduced the severity of an injury in these scenarios
  • Use the hurt-based severity scale to assign a PHL, using the potential hurt that could have occurred in the worst-case feasible-but-reasonable scenario,
  • Document the PHL rationale (e.g., scenario used, mitigations in place, maximum hurt possible)

Mining the Diamond

The ExxonMobil Development Company implemented an initiative, called “mining the diamond,” to increase awareness of and prioritize action on high-­consequence potential safety events (Fig. 5).

Mining the diamond.

A safety event is considered a high-consequence event if it results in multiple fatalities (AHL5), a single fatality (AHL4), or a life-altering injury (AHL3). A safety event is considered a high-consequence potential event if there was feasible but reasonable potential for it to have resulted in multiple fatalities (PHL5), a single fatality (PHL4), or a life-altering injury (PHL3). By definition, a high-consequence safety event is also considered a high-consequence potential event because both the AHL and the PHL are 3 or higher. High-­consequence potential safety events are also known as PHL3+, or diamond, events.

It is critical that safety leadership focus on assessing every safety event, regardless of recordability, severity, or whether someone was actually hurt. However, that does not necessarily mean every safety event will yield enhanced value from a comprehensive, multidisciplinary team taking weeks to assess the event using the latest in incident-­investigation technology and methodology. Mining the diamond is the first step in prioritizing resources for a safety event that has occurred. The majority of safety events can be adequately assessed to learn lessons within 1–2 hours, yet some take several hours, a few take days, and the extraordinary event may take weeks. The majority of incidents can be assessed with less-formal, less-comprehensive investigation techniques. All safety events that fall inside the diamond, on the basis of their AHL3+ or PHL3+ rating, have the potential to maim or kill. These safety events warrant and require a detailed assessment to maximize lessons learned so that actions can be taken to prevent similar future events; therefore, all diamond events require in-depth root-causal-­factor analysis.

This article, written by Editorial Manager Adam Wilson, contains highlights of paper SPE 163757, “A Hurt-Based Approach to Safety,” by R.M. Smith, SPE, and M.L. Jones, ExxonMobil, prepared for the 2013 SPE Americas E&P Health, Safety, Security, and Environmental Conference, Galveston, Texas, 18–20 March. The paper has not been peer reviewed.

For a limited time, the complete paper is free to SPE members at www.spe.org/jpt.

An Integrated Noise-Protection Program in Angola

Published August 15, 2013

An epidemiological study was developed to take into account specific employee habits while measuring the possible prevalence of hearing problems arising from earlier occupational exposure. During 30 years of war, Angolans were exposed to high levels of noise, a factor exacerbated by the offshore environment many workers now share. A population of nonexposed staff, largely administrative, was compared with a population of offshore workers. The results did not show any significant difference in hearing capabilities.

Introduction

Noise-induced hearing loss (NIHL) is the most prevalent irreversible industrial disease, and noise is the most prevalent compensable occupational hazard. In developing countries, occupational noise and urban environmental noise are increasing risk factors for hearing impairment, which may lead to increased incidence of accidents at work.

Unlike most other occupational injuries, NIHL occurs without any visible exterior evidence or trauma and is perceived too late. While irreversible, it is fully preventable with proper job design, training, and protection measures. The estimated cost of noise to developed countries ranges from 0.2 to 2% of gross domestic product. However, there is a lack of accurate epidemiological studies on prevalence, risk factors, and costs of NIHL, particularly in developing countries.

In an audiogram, the decrease in the hearing threshold is detected at an early stage, allowing preventive measures to be taken. Changes in audiometric tracings are common and usually bilateral. Changes in the hearing threshold involve an initial notch at high frequencies of 3,000, 4,000, and 6,000 Hz, which, over 10 to 15 years of exposure, reach a maximum of 75 dB. Thereafter, medium and low frequencies are gradually affected up to a maximum of 40 dB.

Noise-Exposure Risks in Angola

Social and Environmental Exposure. During the civil war that ended in 2002, people were exposed to high noise peaks from gunfire, explosions, and tank battles. Throughout this period, no medical assessments or epidemiological data were available. There is no public law on noise pollution, and, in Luanda, nightclubs play loud music throughout the night from Thursday until Monday. Common transport buses have powerful sound systems, exposing drivers, riders, bystanders, and other commuters in numerous traffic jams to noise peaks. Traffic in Luanda during the week is heavily congested, and there is a constant cacophony of car horns and car alarms. Industry workers are exposed to noise during offshore drilling and production operations, onshore logistics operations, and air travel. Currently, there is no national labor legislation enforcing noise limits.

Total E&P Angola (TEPA) Rule. Table 1 provides limits based on European Directive 2003/10/EC concerning noise. In zones where the normal single-ear protection of the worker cannot reduce the noise below the occupational exposure limit (OEL) of 87 dB(A), double hearing protection is made mandatory by display of the safety sign in Fig. 1. 

Double-hearing-protection safety sign.

Hearing-Conservation Program

TEPA’s program consists of the following actions: an epidemiological study, noise and vibration studies on offshore facilities, direct and individual monitoring campaigns with noise mapping, noise-awareness campaigns, and mandatory audiometry during an offshore medical exam.

Epidemiological Study. The cross-­sectional study was conducted from ­August to October 2010 in Luanda. Subjects included Angolan offshore workers and a comparative group comprising administrative employees from offices in Luanda. Statistical software was used. A confidence interval of 95% with a beta error of 20% was accepted, with a 16% prevalence of hearing loss in the nonexposed group and a 2:1 exposed/nonexposed ratio in the proportion of 91:46. Simple random sampling was used for the offshore group, and paired samples matched by age were used for the administrative group. The study involved 164 employees (113 offshore, 51 administrative). Twenty-seven workers were eventually excluded from the statistical analysis. The analysis phase considered 92 (44%) out of 209 Angolan offshore workers and 45 (6%) out of 736 Angolan administrative workers, all male.

For the audiological assessment, a minimum of 14 hours of auditory rest was recommended before the audiometric test in order to reduce the possibility of a temporary drop in hearing threshold. Participants responded to an individual questionnaire about their family and personal history of hearing disease, lifestyle, and exposure to noise (both nonoccupational and occupational), and aired any hearing complaints. A bilateral inspection was conducted of the outer ear, the external auditory meatus, and the tympanic membrane. Hearing tests were followed directly by a screening for hearing abnormalities by a practitioner in general and family medicine. The audio­grams were then interpreted by a specialist in occupational medicine.

Data were processed using statistical software. For continuous variables, results were expressed as means, standard deviation, medians, and interquartile ranges. Categorical variables were expressed as frequencies and percentages.

Sociodemographic Characteristics. The population consisted of very young adults, 82% having worked at the company for less than 10 years; nearly half were younger than 30, and 82% were younger than 40. Nearly half the offshore population had been working at the company for less than 4 years, while half the administrative group had been working there for 2 years or less, indicating a statistically significant difference. Fig. 2

Offshore employees (92) distributed into homogeneous noise-exposure groups.

represents the distribution of the offshore group by activity, according to homogeneous exposure groups defined by the company.

Audiological Assessment. A clinical questionnaire examined the medical history and symptoms of hearing disease. In the occupational section of the questionnaire, there were no significant differences between groups in their responses on the use of firearms, military service, motorcycle riding, time spent in noisy environments outside the working environment, and previous hearing tests. The history of prior or current work performed in a noisy environment and the use of or recommendation to use ear protectors was significantly higher in the offshore group.

Comparison of Hearing Thresholds. With respect to the left ear, all mean values in both groups were less than 15 dB and the mean audiometric curves were similar at all frequencies, except at 500 and 8,000 Hz. At all frequencies except 500 Hz, the mean thresholds of the offshore group were slightly higher than those of the administrative group; at 500 Hz, the hearing threshold was significantly lower in the administrative group.

In the offshore group, the mean threshold extremes ranged from a minimum of 6.63 dB at 1,000 Hz to a maximum of 13.75 dB at 8,000 Hz. In the administrative group, the mean threshold extremes ranged from 5.89 dB at 1,000 Hz to 11.11 dB at 6,000 Hz. When we compare the mean curves of both ears in the two groups, we can see that the shape of the mean hearing thresholds matches the previous audiometric curves. When comparing both groups, we notice a significant difference in the median threshold analysis of both ears at frequencies of 500 Hz (p=0.002) and 8,000 Hz (p=0.023).

Results of the Study

The offshore group is young (median=30 years) and has been exposed to occupational noise for a short period of time at the company (median=4 years). The shape of its audiometric curve does not suggest noise-induced hearing loss and, at almost every frequency, is similar to that of the administrative group. In the left ear, a comparison of hearing thresholds (median) between offshore and administrative groups showed no statistically significant differences at frequencies of 1,000 to 8,000 Hz. The audiometric curves were almost flat and identical to each other. In the right ear, results were similar. These findings do not meet the criteria for noise-induced hearing loss (threshold >25 dB) and may be monitored in subsequent studies. With at least one hearing threshold above 25 dB, changes were found in 14% of the offshore group’s audiogram results and in 13% of the administrative-group results, though the difference between the two was insignificant.

Noise and Vibration Studies on Offshore Facilities. An internationally recognized company made noise and vibration studies onboard company floating production, storage, and offloading vessels (FPSOs). The studies resulted in color mappings of all decks in which the noisiest installations were distinguished. These zones on deck were clearly marked with ear-protection safety signs and floor painting. High noise levels are mainly present at pumps, valves, and pipes with turbulent fluid flow; at hydrocyclones and separators; and at compressors, turbines, and generators. Engineering controls to damp down noise and vibration were implemented as a result of the recommendations made in the report.

Direct and Individual Monitoring Campaigns With Noise Mapping. The company Industrial Hygiene Department organizes annual noise-­monitoring campaigns consisting of direct monitoring with a Class 2 noisemeter of the produced noise in decks, offices, and living quarters. The measurements are then extrapolated onto noise maps by use of specific-color balls in relation to the common personal protective equipment used onboard. Work in high-noise areas for a prolonged period of time requires a special work permit defining the permissible exposure time. Apart from the direct measurements, 10 volunteers from different similar-­exposure groups are individually monitored during 5 consecutive days using noise badges registering the noise above 70 dB(A). It is mathematically possible that a worker does not exceed the OEL calculated over the entire shift, but does go beyond the OEL during a part of the shift. For every 3 dB that the OEL plus attenuation from the ear protection is exceeded, the exposure time must be halved. Abseilers, mechanics, and electricians are the main job categories exposed to high noise.

Noise-Awareness Campaigns. During the monitoring campaigns and also during presentations to offshore and office workers, noise-awareness campaigns are organized in French, English, and Portuguese. The purpose is to familiarize the workers with the com­pany’s ­hearing-conservation program and to ensure that they protect themselves from noise both in the occupational environment and in their time off. Workers are also trained in use of a variety of ear-protection equipment.

Mandatory Audiometry During Offshore Medical Exam. Audiometric testing is an important part of hearing-preservation programs. It allows early identification of employees with increasing hearing deficits and prevention of future NIHL. All offshore workers are obligated to undergo an audiometry during their annual medical exam. Each worker has an individual Health Risk Assessment File that identifies major hazards to the examining doctor. Exposure to high noise levels is stated as one of these risks. At the time of hiring, new employees are also required to undergo an audiometry exam. The data of the audio­metry and the results from the noise-risk assessments are stored in a specific databank for 50 years.

This article, written by JPT Technology Editor Chris Carpenter, contains highlights of paper SPE 157292, “Integrated Noise Protection Program—From Noise Measurements to Epidemiology,” by Tania Batalha, Nico De Sadeleer, and Stephan Plisson-Saune, Total E&P Angola, prepared for the 2012 SPE/APPEA International Conference on Health, Safety, and Environment in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production, Perth, Australia, 11–13 September. The paper has not been peer reviewed.

For a limited time, the complete paper is free to SPE members at www.spe.org/jpt.

Legislation, Commerce, and Ethics Drive Design of Quieter Facilities in Australia

Published August 14, 2013

Legislation, economics, and ethics are major drivers behind the adoption of engineering noise controls during offshore-facility design in Australia. The global challenge facing noise advisers is to understand how these factors influence the adoption of engineering noise controls and to work closely with project teams to ensure that operational-noise risk is as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). Implementing these controls during the front-end engineering and design (FEED) can ultimately protect a company and its workforce during facility operation and can turn major capital projects (MCPs) into valued legacy operations.

Introduction

It is commonly said that “health and safety are good for business” without seeing substantiated claims. However, if health and safety truly are good for business, it should be demonstrably so. This may involve an evaluation of the costs vs. benefits of each health and safety initiative, as well as the feasibility of implementing them. One such initiative is hearing preservation.

Cost/benefit analysis (CBA) is an ­important tool that can be used to compare the net economic worth of various health and safety initiatives to determine how best to allocate finite project resources to maximize a project’s value. Various international cost/benefit models exist to help companies perform economic evaluations of health and safety initiatives. An Australian ALARP model recently used by Chevron Australia during the design of an offshore production facility in the North West Shelf of Western Australia is one of them.

Additionally, discounted-cash-flow (DCF) analysis is introduced as a means of supplementing conventional CBA to help decision makers determine when, during the lifetime of a project, engineering noise controls should be implemented to maximize a project’s net present value (NPV).

The decision to implement effective engineering noise controls is not based solely on economics, but it is a major driver behind the selection and implementation of proposals that can affect a company’s bottom line. Other key drivers are legislation and business ethics or cultural expectations.

Legislative Drivers

Noise legislation in the Australian offshore petroleum industry combines “goal-setting” and prescriptive requirements.

The goal-setting legislation, governed by the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage Act 2006, requires the registered operator of a facility to take all reasonably practicable steps to ensure that the facility is safe and without risk to the health of any person at or near the facility. In other words, the onus is on the operator to demonstrate that all reasonable steps have been taken to protect the health of any person at or near that facility.

With respect to noise management, this duty is supplemented by a prescriptive requirement under the Offshore Petroleum and Greenhouse Gas Storage (Safety) Regulations 2009. These prescriptive requirements are explicit in nature. Therefore, exposures above the exposure standard alone are not enough to establish noncompliance with the regulations; however, excessive exposures and noncompliance with the approved code of practice is.

The legislation as written does not require new offshore-facility designs to incorporate all reasonably practicable engineering noise controls to protect future workers. Rather, a person must first be exposed to a noise source before an operator is legally required to do anything about it. This may seem counterintuitive to best-practice facility design and suggests that the legislation is not a major driver toward quieter facilities; however, the reality is very different.

Should a proposed operator of a facility undertake a noise-exposure study during FEED and find that noise exposures would probably exceed the exposure standards when that facility is fully operational, they can do one of three things:

  • Implement all reasonably practicable engineering noise controls before the production phase of the facility
  • Implement some engineering noise controls but not all that are reasonably practicable
  • Do nothing (i.e., implement no further engineering noise controls before the production phase of the facility)

If a facility owner chooses to do nothing during FEED (Option 3), it is accepting that it would likely be allowing workers on the facility to be exposed to a level of noise in excess of the exposure standards. Therefore, Option 3 is likely to put the operator in a position of noncompliance when the facility becomes operational.

During the production phase of a facility, the onus is still on the operator to demonstrate to the regulator that all reasonably practicable steps have been taken to minimize noise exposures on the facility. However, it is potentially much more expensive to make this demonstration when the facility is operational than during FEED or even detailed design. If some controls are implemented before production (Option 2), it might lessen the effect of expenditure later on and potentially the likelihood and severity of regulatory intervention (regulatory risk), but it may still occasionally give rise to conditions in which workers are overexposed to noise.

Alternatively, Option 1 may be adopted, which involves the consideration and subsequent implementation of all reasonably practicable engineering noise controls before the facility’s production phase. This should be the design goal of any offshore facility in Australia because it is the most cost-effective and defensible approach to managing both regulatory and occupational-noise risks.

Fig. 1

ALARP diagram.

shows what is meant by the term ALARP. ALARP is determined when the risk to health has been reduced as far as can be achieved without the costs of implementing the control becoming disproportionately higher than the benefits of having it. Further cost is unnecessary and can be considered wasteful.

Commercial Drivers

Fig. 2

Cost vs. time in application of engineering noise controls.

indicates the general relationship between the cost of implementing engineering controls and flexibility to make design variations as an MCP progresses from FEED to operation.

During FEED, capital expenditure is the most significant cost that needs to be considered; however, as an MCP moves toward detailed design, should re-­engineering and variations be required, then additional labor and contractual costs can quickly mount. This can become compounded further if a retrofit is required during the production phase, with the introduction of further re-­engineering, variations, installation costs, piping modifications, commissioning costs, and loss of production.

Fig. 3

Cost comparison of implementing engineering noise controls during various phases of an MCP. The model presents costs in 2010 dollars and does not account for projected inflation, foreign exchange rates, or other cost factors, including the time value of money.

shows how an initial outlay of Australian dollars (AUD) 300,000 during FEED can increase to AUD 725,000 by the end of FEED if re-engineering and variations are introduced. In comparison, the identical changes made a few years later during operations could cost AUD 2,275,000 in 2010 dollars.

Therefore, considering appropriate engineering controls during FEED can significantly reduce the financial outlay compared with implementing the same controls later. Furthermore, strategic selection of engineering noise controls during FEED can dramatically reduce noise exposures when the facility starts production.

Incorporating DCF Analysis Into CBA. DCF analysis is a useful tool to assess the value of engineering noise controls because it can be used to demonstrate how investment decisions made during facility design can affect a company’s future earnings per share.

The workplace-interventions net-cost (WIN) calculator developed in Singapore evaluates the net costs of health and safety interventions, such as noise controls, by estimating net-annualized costs, adjusted for the investment costs of the interventions (labor and capital), anticipated productivity enhancements from the changes, and cost savings resulting from averted hearing loss (e.g., litigation, compensation, insurances, rehabilitation). The model is one example of a cost/benefit approach; however, another model is already being applied successfully in Australia and is gaining broad acceptance in the offshore oil and gas industry.

This model, originally developed by an Australian acoustic-engineering consultancy for evaluating engineering noise controls, works by weighing the benefits of each proposed noise control in terms of the overall reduction in noise exposure it provides vs. the costs or uncertainties associated with its implementation. The latter include:

  • Financial costs (i.e., What is the capital cost of the control?)
  • Operability costs (i.e., Does the control affect operation of the equipment?)
  • Maintainability costs (i.e., Does the control affect equipment maintenance?)
  • Process costs (i.e., Can the control affect overall facility performance?)
  • Project-execution costs (i.e., Is the project schedule affected?)
  • Occupational health and safety risks (i.e., Does the control increase or introduce certain occupational health and safety risks?)
  • Integrity of the solution (i.e., Is it proven or novel technology?)

The Australian-consultancy model (the ALARP model) may be used to demonstrate that noise risks are ALARP and is appropriate for this purpose. This is a distinct advantage over the WIN calculator because it can potentially satisfy a regulator that the intent of the legislation has been achieved. However, a disadvantage of the ALARP model is that it does not take into account potential cost savings that may be realized from averted hearing loss, potential productivity enhancements, or labor intervention costs for each proposed control.

The ALARP model could be enhanced by considering productivity effects, labor intervention costs, and savings associated with averted hearing loss and be supplemented by use of DCF analysis to determine when a control should be implemented during an MCP in order to maximize the NPV. Most likely, this will be during FEED for production-critical equipment. DCF analysis, therefore, is an important driver for determining when engineering noise controls should be implemented.

Ethical Drivers

Adverse noise exposure accounts for approximately 37% of all hearing loss in Australia, which is most commonly sourced from workplace noise and recreational noise. Therefore, operators of MCPs in Australia have a societal obligation as good corporate citizens to reduce their contributions to occupational exposure as far as is reasonably practicable. Because it is a very simple process to model noise exposures during facility design, it is becoming increasingly difficult for operators of MCPs to overlook noise control on the facilities they are designing.

An analogy that can be used to compare conventional facility design with an ALARP model for noise control is speeding in a motor vehicle. One may get into a vehicle and choose to speed. Every time one does so, one is breaking the law, regardless of whether one gets caught. This implies that speeding is unreasonable.

Designing a conventional facility where workers are likely to be exposed to unreasonable noise is really no different. Therefore, the ethical solution is to design a facility where people are not exposed to unreasonable noise levels in the first place. In order to do this, operators of MCPs should take all reasonably practicable steps to minimize hazardous noise before production, when noise exposures (hence risk) actually occur.

The analogy highlights an ethical dilemma facing operators of MCPs who may believe that speeding is not acceptable but that exposing workers to unreasonable noise is. In a real sense, a step change in safety culture is required to create a mindset that is intolerant of any level of hearing loss. This ought to be a key goal of any noise-­management ­program.

This article, written by Editorial Manager Adam Wilson, contains highlights of paper SPE 156732, “Why Quiet? Legislative, Commercial, and Ethical Drivers Behind the Design of Quieter Offshore Facilities in Australia,” by Andrew Chandran, Chevron Australia, prepared for the 2012 SPE/APPEA International Conference on Health, Safety, and Environment in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production, Perth, Australia, 11–13 September. The paper has not been peer reviewed.

For a limited time, the complete paper is free to SPE members at www.spe.org/jpt.

Review of Water Use at Canada’s Oil Sands Points Toward Environmental Sustainability

Published August 13, 2013

Concerns have been expressed and published about the amount of water used in Canada’s oil-sands industry. The oil-sands deposits are geographically separated from population and agricultural centers in the province of Alberta and are within some of the most prolific river basins. Analysis shows that the amounts of water used by oil-sands operations are low and sustainable. A track record of continuous improvements at existing operations and the application of new technologies will maintain the sustainability into the future.

Introduction

The three oil-sands deposits within the province of Alberta. In-situ oil-sands recovery takes place within all three deposits. Oil-sands mining is found only within the Athabasca deposit.

Canada’s oil sands are in three deposits in northern Alberta (Fig. 1). The oil-sands deposits hold 1.8 trillion bbl of oil with 169 billion bbl of economically recoverable reserves. This represents 97% of Canada’s oil reserves, which are the third largest in the world.

The term “oil sands” is used to describe unconsolidated bituminous sands. The oil saturation in the sands has very high viscosity and is commonly called bitumen or tar. The deposits are found within the McMurray, Clearwater, and Grand Rapids formations of the Mann­ville group. They are of varying depth, from near surface in some parts of the Athabasca deposit to more than 300 m deep in the Peace River and Cold Lake deposits. Where the oil sands are shallower than 70 m, they may be mined by surface strip mining. This represents 3% of the surface area of the oil sands and 20% of the reserves. The remaining 80% of reserves across all three deposits are accessible only by use of in-situ recovery methods. Both mining and in-situ methods are water based.

How Water Is Used in Canada’s Oil Sands

Because of the high viscosity of the bitumen within the oil sands (8–12°API, >50,000 cp), it does not flow easily and is difficult or impossible to recover with conventional oil methods. The vast majority of commercial operations rely on hot water or steam to reduce the viscosity of the bitumen to allow its recovery.

For in-situ methods, this involves the injection of steam into the oil-sands reservoir and subsequent recovery of the bitumen once it is reduced in viscosity. For mining, the water is used to slurry the oil, transport it, and finally separate it from the ore.

Water Use for In-Situ Oil-Sands Recovery Methods. In areas too deep for mining, oil is extracted from the reservoirs by use of steam injection. The two commercial techniques currently used for in-situ recovery are cyclic steam stimulation (CSS) and steam-assisted gravity drainage (SAGD).

A schematic showing the in-situ thermal oil-sands process of CSS.

CSS uses the same oil wells over multiple cycles to inject steam and to recover oil (Fig. 2). Each cycle consists of three stages. In the first stage, steam at approximately 300°C is injected under pressure into the reservoir. The heat from the steam then is allowed to equilibrate in a reservoir soak stage. In the third stage, the hot and lower-viscosity oil is pumped from the reservoir along with condensed steam and sent to a central processing facility. The cycle is then repeated. A typical multiwell pad at the Cold Lake operation will go through 8–12 cycles.

SAGD (Fig. 3)

A schematic showing the in-situ thermal oil-sands process of SAGD.

uses precision horizontal drilling to position horizontal well pairs such that one well is above the other within the oil-sands reservoir. The upper well is used to inject steam (at approximately 200–250°C) into the formation where it rises and percolates through the oil-sands deposits, creating a steam chamber. The steam displaces and heats the bitumen, which flows downward by gravity and is recovered by pumping the lower well.

For both CSS and SAGD, the water produced with the bitumen is separated and reinjected into the reservoir. The recycle rate depends on the supply and demand for steam in the operation, the quality of the produced water, and the technology used for water treatment. In all operations, if the produced-­water volume exceeds the steam-injection volumes, then water must be disposed of through deep-well injection. Usually, however, and always during startup of a new operation when there is little or no produced water, the volume of produced water is less than the volume required for steam. In these cases, new water volumes (called makeup water) are required to make up for the shortfall.

Water Use for Oil-Sands Mining. Fig. 4

A schematic showing the key steps, water sources, and process streams involved in an oil-sands mining oil operation.

is a schematic of how bitumen is produced from oil-sands mining operations. After the overburden is removed from above the oil-sands ore, large shovels capable of up to 100 t/load fill large haul trucks with capacities of up to 400 t/load. The haul trucks transport the ore to a crushing facility, where it is crushed and mixed with water to create a slurry that is transported by pipeline (called hydrotransport) to a central processing facility. The agitation and mixing during hydrotransport begin the process of separating the bitumen from the oil sands. At the processing facility, the bitumen is separated from the slurry and sent to an on-site upgrader or off-site refinery. The waste products consisting of residual bitumen, sand, fine particles, and water are sent to a tailings area, where the water is separated from the solids and recycled into the process. Traditional tailings technology uses tailings ponds to settle the solids from the water.

During the extraction process, the oil-sands ore is converted from a compact bitumen-bearing porous medium to a looser water-bearing tailings product. The bitumen is essentially replaced with water. However, because the tailings have more pore space than the original ore, the ratio of water used to bitumen produced is greater than unity.

The water sources for oil-sands mining operations include the recycled tailings water, Athabasca River water, groundwater, and surface water runoff. The largest overall water source is the recycled tailings water, which, after startup, represents approximately 80% of the water used in the operations.

Natural Availability of Water in Alberta’s Oil-Sands Areas

On a global scale, Canada has 7% of the annual renewable water supply and one of the largest per-capita water supplies, with an excess of 70 000 m3 available per person per year, an average drainage yield of 3.4 trillion m3/a, and national water usage of less than 10% of supply.

On the basis of 2009 numbers, the Canadian government has licensed or allocated 9.9 billion m3 of fresh water, or 7.6% of provincial supply, for use in Alberta. The oil and gas industry is allocated 830 million m3, which represents 8.4% of the provincial allocations and 0.6% of the provincial water supply.

The oil-sands industry is distributed across the northern half of the province, within the Peace, Beaver, and Athabasca river basins. The total water allocations in the Peace and Athabasca river basins are 0.4 and 4.3%, respectively. In all basins, the allocation to the oil and gas sector (which is dominated by oil-sands production in these three basins) is 3% or less of available average annual supply.

Actual Water Use, Forecast Water Use, and Continuous Improvement for Oil-Sands In-Situ Operations

The principal water sources for the in-situ thermal industry are recycled produced water, fresh surface water, fresh groundwater, and saline groundwater. With recycling performance of approximately 90%, recycled produced water is by far the largest water source used. For makeup water, historically the industry has relied on fresh water. However, over the past several decades and increasingly over the past 10 years, industry has been increasing the amount of saline makeup water as an alternative to fresh water.

Between 2002 and 2010, the growth in saline-water use has outpaced the growth in freshwater use to the extent that saline-water use has now exceeded freshwater use. In 2010, the total freshwater use was 17.5 million m3, which is split between the Beaver River basin (7.4 million m3), the Athabasca River basin (6.1 million m3), and the Peace River basin (4 million m3). These volumes correspond to only 0.02% of the average natural flows in these basins. Individually, the water use corresponds to 1.2% of Beaver River flows, 0.03% of Athabasca River flows, and 0.006% of Peace River flows.

In 2010, productivity for the in-­situ industry was 0.43 (17.5 million m3 of fresh water to produce 40.8 million m3 of bitumen). This value is used to project freshwater use. By 2030, this assumption results in a freshwater use of 78 million m3. However, given the trend toward saline water over the last 10 years, 78 million m3 is likely a high-volume case. If the trends over the last 10 years for reduction in fresh water are followed, then the resulting use in 2030 will be 38 million m3, with a freshwater-to-bitumen productivity of 0.21. These numbers represent a range of 0.04–0.09% of available average flows in the Peace, Beaver, and Athabasca basins and clearly represent a sustainable water use.

Actual Water Use, Forecast Water Use, and Continuous Improvement for Oil-Sands Mining Operations

All oil-sands mining occurs within the Athabasca River basin, as shown in Fig. 1. Similar to in-situ operations, the largest source of water used in the mining extraction process is recycled water. In general, approximately 80–90% of the water used to recover bitumen is recycled process-­affected water. Unlike in-situ operations, however, the use and storage of process-affected water and tailings in open mine pits and tailings impoundments on the surface limit the amount of saline water that may be used in the operation. For this reason and the potential for disruption of the extraction process by some salts, the principal source of makeup water for oil-sands mining is fresh water.

Approximately 71% of the fresh water is sourced from the Athabasca River. The remaining makeup water is sourced from fresh groundwater (6%) or surface water runoff collected at the mine (23%). These values vary with the weather and the season. Because oil-sands mines take a long time to design and construct after approvals and water licenses are received, the water allocations outpace development. For these reasons, actual water usage is significantly less than allocated water. During 2009–11, an average of only 22% of oil-sands-mining allocations was used.

Water use tracks bitumen production fairly closely. Peaks in water use typically correspond to the startup of new mines or to expansions. Mines have a higher water use in startup years because it can take time to build enough water inventory to start recycling from the tailings areas. To avoid this issue, mines can partly fill tailings areas with water before operation to enable the recycling system to function earlier. In either case, there is a peak in water withdrawals during mine startup.

Recent projections show mining production will grow to 1.33 million B/D (77 million m3/a) by 2020 and 1.89 million B/D (110 million m3/a) by 2030. Using the average productivity of 2.5, Athabasca River withdrawals are forecast to be approximately 6 m3/s (194 million m3) in 2020 and approximately 9 m3/s (277 million m3) by 2030. These represent 1–1.4% of the average annual flows at Fort McMurray. In 2009, the Oil Sands Developers Group conducted a projection for two very aggressive growth cases of 2.5 million B/D and 3.5 million B/D of bitumen by 2020. It was determined that water requirements could grow to between 11 and 16 m3/s or 1.5–2.5% of the annual average flows of the Athabasca River at Fort McMurray for the two cases. Thus, even aggressive-growth cases use a small percentage of annual average natural flows.

Conclusions

Summing all of the 2030 projected freshwater demands for both in-situ recovery and oil-sands mining results in a requirement of 428 million–469 million m3, which is approximately 0.4% of the provincial water supply and 0.5% of the natural flows of the three basins containing the oil-sands deposits. Given continuous improvement and advances in technology, it is expected that these projected volumes will drop. Nonetheless, current projections show that, by 2030, only 0.4% of the water in the province of Alberta will be used to produce 80% of Canada’s total crude-oil output.

This article, written by Editorial Manager Adam Wilson, contains highlights of paper SPE 156676, “Water Use in Canada’s Oil-Sands Industry: The Facts,” by Stuart Lunn, Imperial Oil Resources, prepared for the 2012 SPE/APPEA International Conference on Health, Safety, and Environment in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production, Perth, Australia, 11–13 September. The paper has not been peer reviewed.

For a limited time, the complete paper is free to SPE members at www.spe.org/JPT.

Extensive Environmental-Monitoring Project Relies on Integration of Several Networks

Published August 12, 2013

A comprehensive environmental-monitoring project in the Agri Valley in southern Italy has been developed to ensure continuous management of the environmental effects of Eni’s oil treatment center there. This project is able to control the environmental effects of exploration and production in a large area around the plant (100 km2). It is characterized by a complete integration of several networks, stations, and systems used to monitor simultaneously air quality, noise, odorous emissions in terms of olfactory nuisance, groundwater and soil quality, ecosystems status, and ecological biodiversity.

Introduction

The area where the environmental-­monitoring project was developed is characterized by sites that have community-level protection, especially areas protected because of national parks, widespread woods, rivers and streams of high quality, and springs and ground­water of great regional and national importance for the production of safe drinking water.

Eni’s oil treatment center in the Agri Valley.

Eni’s oil treatment center in this territory collects the production from 24 oil wells, amounting to approximately 104,000 BOPD (Fig. 1). 

 

The environmental-monitoring plan consists of environmental-monitoring networks on more than 100 km2 at altitudes between 600 and 900 m. The system includes monitoring networks relevant to the following environmental variables:

  • Air quality
  • Biosystems
  • Bad odors
  • Noise
  • Microseismicity
  • Ecosystem
  • Air Quality

The network consists of four monitoring units placed 2.3–4.8 km from the oil center. The sites were chosen according to a model that predicted the spread of emissions from the oil center. The air-quality-monitoring stations were installed outside the plant to continuously identify the effects that production activities have on the quality of the air and to provide operational warnings to avoid any negative effect on the surrounding territory.

Each unit is provided with computerized instruments, allowing continuous monitoring of the levels of carbon monoxide, hydrogen sulfide, sulfur dioxide, ozone, nitrogen oxides, benzene, toluene, xylene, methane, nonmethane gases, volatile organic compounds, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, and radon, and monitoring of meteorological standards (e.g., wind speed and direction, rainfall levels, humidity, temperature).

The data received continuously from the monitoring units are reported in real time on the Web and in the control room of the plant and are compared continuously with information on pollution standards taken from the chimneys of the oil center.

Biosystems

In close correlation with the air quality, a biomonitoring system focused on lichens has been developed. This does not consist of a direct detection of negative effects on the environment but allows measurement of any changes in the normal conditions of the components of the ecosystems reactive to pollution (in this specific case, lichens). In fact, lichens are specific indicators of biological effects of air pollution. As biological indicators, lichens are a useful instrument to ascertain the effects of pollution, eutrophication, climate change, and forest management.

The ecological variations caused by environmental pollution can appear in bodies at three different levels:

  • Morphological or structural variations
  • Increase of polluting substances
  • Alterations in the composition of animal and plant communities

The aim of the lichen biomonitoring network is to build a permanent pool of survey stations to determine the current conditions of the survey area (with particular reference to the atmospheric component), which will be kept as a reference point for evaluation of changes in the environmental conditions.

To decide the best locations for the network, the territory was divided into 1-km-wide cells. Following that scheme, 33 points in the Agri Valley affected by the presence of the oil center were identified.

The stations of the lichen biomonitoring network are used to determine the following indicators:

  • Lichen biodiversity through the application of the lichen biodiversity index, applied to assess environmental quality at the 33 stations
  • Bioaccumulation study on elements of environmental importance and toxicological interest in lichen transplants for the use of lichens as biomonitors for traces of atmospheric deposition (a lichen-transplant technique will be used to create detailed maps regarding the deposition of elements and the study of the relevant temporal changes)

Bad Odors

Electronic nose.

Within the environmental-monitoring plan, it has been the intention to determine potential odors disturbing people living near the oil center. The monitoring activity is divided into two stages. The first stage is to determine the concentration of unpleasant odors in gas samples by using a dynamic olfactometry, a discontinuous sampling method. The second stage, a continuous measuring method, uses an electronic nose (Fig. 2). 

 

The survey method uses a group of people who behave as sensors. Each examiner is trained and chosen according to sensorial and behavioral standards, keeping in mind the limitations of the regulation applied. The method is based on the identification, on the part of a test group, of the threshold of the sample’s olfactory result—that is, the limit within which, after having been diluted, the odor is perceived by 50% of the examiners.

For the malodorous sample to reach said threshold, an olfactometer is used. This instrument is able to dilute the sample of malodorous gas with neutral air, which is odorless, according to precise reports.

Together with the discontinuous-sampling odor monitoring and laboratory analysis, a continuous measuring campaign is conducted with electronic noses. An electronic nose is installed outside the plant next to one of the air-quality-­control stations to measure the olfactory effect of the same plant for 2–4 weeks.

Noise

The noise-monitoring system is made up of four measuring stations. Two are placed near the oil center to measure the noise directly related to the activity taking place inside the plant. Two others are placed next to the population centers near the plant. Each station contains a sound meter/analyzer for continuous measurement of the sound pressure level, maximum or minimum sound levels, peak sound pressure, and the noise spectrum. The measurements are taken at a height of 1.5 m from the surface of the station, in normal thermohygrometric conditions, related to the measurement site.

Microseismicity

The network is made up of 14 detection stations distributed in an area of approximately 1500 km2 around the oil center, aimed at monitoring earthquakes with magnitudes less than 3 on the Richter scale. This network is important for the emotional well-being of the neighboring population because it eases concerns about the correlation between earthquakes and oil and gas operations.

The peripheral stations are provided with geophones. The signals acquired in each station are transmitted through a global system for mobile communications phone signal to the data-processing center, which extracts the following information:

  • Local earthquakes, those having an epicenter inside the network or less than 10 km from one of the stations
  • Regional earthquakes, those having an epicenter 10–100 km away
  • Nonregional earthquakes, those having an epicenter more than 100 km away

Ecosystem

Soil, Subsoil, and Underground Water. Soil, subsoil, and underground-water monitoring is conducted to check the quality of the environmental matrix near the plant, to verify any infiltration of pollution, and to monitor the conservation of the territory to ensure sustainability of the oil activities in the Agri Valley.

The characterization of the soil and subsoil matrix is conducted through geological surveys for the local lithostratigraphical reconstruction and through soil samples taken for chemical surveys.

Surface Water and Sediments. The monitoring of surface water and fluvial sediments is conducted with respect to what is foreseen by Italian regulations and, in particular, considering the main water resources present in the area. For each point at which the surface water is measured, two samples are taken, one from the surface and one from deeper.

The monitoring activity allows determination of the quality for each survey period near each water source studied, guaranteeing, in time, continuous control of the characteristic ecological condition of the matrix.

Vegetation. The aim of the vegetation monitoring is to recognize not only the species but also the different types of habitats to which the species are bound for their survival.

A phytosociological method, which studies the geographical, physical, and biological distribution of the vegetable communities and their evolution in space and time, was used to identify and define vegetation habitats. The starting point is that no plant lives in isolation; but, with others of the same species, they create a population. Multiple different species (populations) make up a vegetation community, which presents the biological proof of the features of a certain habitat.

Phytosociology attempts to study vegetation communities (habitat), their distribution, and all the physical and biological relationships characterizing their evolution in space and time.

The method is based on three fundamental principles:

  • The vegetation groupings are characterized by a precise floristic composition.
  • Among all the species making up a community, some better represent the complex relationship among species, communities, and environment. These are defined by high-frequency differential and common features.
  • Said species can be used to form a hierarchical classification of groupings, in which the association is the fundamental element.

The methodology consists of two stages. In the first stage (analytic stage), through the picking of samples, the vegetation communities are analyzed from a qualitative (evaluation of the species present) and quantitative (evaluation of their abundance) point of view. In the second stage (synthetic stage), the different samplings are compared and the syntaxonomical elaboration is conducted, leading to a definition of the typology of the vegetation through the floristic, ecological, and statistical comparison of the samplings.

Macrofauna and Ground Micro­fauna. The superior vertebrates (birds and mammals) are particularly suitable for monitoring the quality of the environment on a large scale. The ubiquity of both classes, or, better, their adaptation ability in a large range of environmental typologies, allows their use in different conditions. Because they play a very substantial role in the trophic chains (food chains), studying them can provide information about alterations at a superior level (community and ecosystem).

Birds can provide excellent indications of both chemical pollution (as in the case of insectivores and rapacious birds) and alteration of habitat composition and structure (especially forest or ecotonal habitats).

The great amount of some species can supply quantitative indications on the availability of a certain habitat (low-selectivity target species), while other species that are more demanding about the specific composition and structure of the habitat in which they live supply qualitative/quantitative indications on the habitat available (selective target species).

Mammals (with the exception of bats), not having the capacity of bird dispersion, are much more sensitive to habitat alterations because, during their displacements, they can be impeded by the presence of altered environments that isolate still-suitable environments.

Conclusions

The environmental-monitoring project in the Agri Valley allows a continuous management of the environmental effects of the activities of the Eni oil treatment center. This project is unique in the upstream industry and represents a possible turning point in the oil and gas industry because of its capability to control all the environmental effects of exploration and production, especially in an environment with human communities, and because it can demonstrate the oil and gas industry’s commitment to business ­sustainability.

This article, written by Editorial Manager Adam Wilson, contains highlights of paper SPE 156294, “Innovative Environmental Monitoring for Upstream Onshore Installation,” by Paolo Carnevale, SPE, and Silvia Di Croce, Eni, prepared for the 2012 SPE/APPEA International Conference on Health, Safety, and Environment in Oil and Gas Exploration and Production, Perth, Australia, 11–13 September. The paper has not been peer reviewed.

For a limited time, the complete paper is free to SPE members at www.spe.org/jpt.

Management System Approach Aims To Meet Human Rights Expectations

Published August 10, 2013

A range of external expectations exists for companies to demonstrate how they respect human rights, including having business processes in place to prevent or mitigate human rights issues caused by the company’s projects or operations. The International Petroleum Industry Environmental Conservation Association (IPIECA) has responded to the emergence of external guidelines in connection to implementing human rights due diligence by improving existing management systems and processes.

Background

United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. The ­United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights were developed through an iterative process spanning 6 years and involving extensive stakeholder consultation.

In the first stage of the work, John Ruggie, United Nations special representative to the secretary-general, conducted 3 years of research to develop the global Protect, Respect, and Remedy Framework on business and human rights. Ruggie developed the framework to help clarify the distinct roles of states and businesses in human rights. It rests on three interdependent pillars—the state duty to protect against human rights abuses by third parties through regulation and legislation; the corporate responsibility to respect human rights through due diligence; and the need for citizens to have access to effective remedy, both judicial and nonjudicial.

The United Nations Human Rights Council endorsed the framework in 2008. Upon endorsement, Ruggie established the United Nations Guiding Principles. The principles supplement the framework by outlining how governments should meet their duties and how companies should demonstrate their responsibilities.

IPIECA’s Business and Human Rights Initiative. IPIECA launched a 3-year business and human rights project that leverages the collective experience and practical knowledge of its members. The objectives of the project are to

  • Support the organizational capability of IPIECA members in two focus areas, company due diligence and community-level grievance mechanisms
  • Serve as the authoritative reference body for the oil and gas industry on business and human rights issues, including the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and other relevant external guidelines

The project is implemented through the IPIECA Human Rights Task Force, made up of 38 members from 20 oil and gas companies and associations. The task force implements four distinct programs.

Collaborative learning: IPIECA organizes technical workshops, with input from external experts, to support the continuous improvement efforts of its members.

Technical guidance: IPIECA develops and disseminates practical guidance and tools to assist members in managing human rights issues at an operational level.

Strategic resource: IPIECA provides technical expertise to relevant external initiatives and groups with the aim of sharing industry’s insights, experience, and knowledge.

Global engagement: IPIECA actively participates in global forums and initiatives to contribute to the growing body of knowledge and ideas on business and human rights issues.

Human Rights Due Diligence Process

Human rights due diligence processes are not a legal requirement but rather a good industry practice to manage issues and effects associated with business operations. The expectations for companies are

  • Respect human rights in projects or operations
  • Seek to prevent or mitigate potential human rights issues that may be directly caused by the company’s projects or operations, or seek to influence partners and suppliers
  • Have in place policies and processes to manage human rights issues
  • Commit to respect human rights with endorsement by senior leadership
  • Conduct assessments to identify potential human rights issues in projects or operations, have processes to manage the issues, and have a means to track the response
  • Communicate with stakeholders how issues are being addressed
  • Establish a grievance mechanism to address issues raised by the community

According to the principles, the due diligence process has four main expectations:

  • Assessing actual and potential effects
  • Integrating and acting upon the findings
  • Tracking responses
  • Communicating how effects are being addressed

Because human rights can cut across different phases of an oil and gas project life cycle; can be associated with different issues and potential effects; and are managed by different company functions, roles, and responsibilities, there is no one-size-fits-all approach to implementing human rights due diligence.

The business case for human rights due diligence is simple and straightforward: It is good business practice to know the potential human rights issues and effects associated with business operations and to factor them into management plans. This is especially important for oil and gas companies that may operate in countries over several decades and where local conditions and circumstances can change.

Some of the business drivers for improving human rights due diligence can be summarized as

  • Identification and management of potential effects on communities, positive and negative
  • Prevention of disruptions to construction and operations and improvement of business continuity, including providing reliable energy and managing budgets and schedules
  • Improvement of relationships with local employees and communities based on ongoing engagement and dialogue about project issues and other relevant concerns
  • Protection of employees, communities, and company assets from negative effects by providing a safe and secure operating environment
  • Creation of positive contributions to host communities (e.g., improving access to health, education, and livelihoods)
  • Protection of the company’s reputation in the country and internationally (e.g., by being a preferred employer and helping to ensure continued access to new markets and customers)

Organizational Reality

The goal—or hope—of many external guidelines and standards, including the United Nations Guiding Principles, is that they will be institutionalized by companies and broader industry. The process will likely undergo three ­phases—habitualization, objectification, and sedimentation.

Habitualization is a response to a given issue, problem, or challenge that may be pertinent to a particular industry. Objectification is when the practice begins to build up a perceived value within the organization. Sedimentation occurs when the practice starts to become part of normal business process and systems governance among different groups within the organization.

Implementing Human Rights Due Diligence Process

A human rights due diligence process can be framed as a “plan, do, check, act” methodology to manage human rights issues and effects. This methodology correlates with the existing ­management-system processes of many oil and gas companies.

  • It leverages existing mechanisms and governance structures.
  • It enables interaction with the company’s process leads, advisors, and other experts, thereby capturing and spreading relevant experience and technical knowledge and building ongoing support.
  • It minimizes unintended risks, such as identifying potential issues and effects without having a systematic way of managing them.
  • It helps companies to integrate identified potential human rights issues and effects with social, environmental, health, and other effects.

Key Components of Human Rights Due Diligence

The core process components of a human rights due diligence are

Vision/Objectives: A company’s vision and objectives for managing human rights are articulated and reinforced through a formal company code of conduct, corporate social responsibility policy, human rights policy, human rights statement, or some other formal mechanism.

Accountability: Because human rights issues cut across different company functions, appropriate roles and responsibilities, including accountability, are assigned. Company processes, programs, or tools should specify which department is responsible and what the associated roles and tasks are.

Assess/Plan: The assessment and planning includes identifying the phase in the project life cycle; taking inventory of existing processes, programs, and tools that can be used to assess potential issues and effects; collating and reviewing information from prior assessments or external sources; and conducting the assessment to identify, scope, and analyze potential issues and effects.

Implementation: Once potential issues and effects are identified and prioritized, findings should be incorporated into a management plan, which includes communication with internal and external stakeholders as needed, with the intent to properly address and close out the issue or effect.

Review: A set of indicators for monitoring, tracking, and evaluating the plan is built into the implementation process. There is no one-size-fits-all approach to the review process; it varies depending on the company’s existing processes and procedures.

Improve: Once the review is completed and the findings are properly scoped and analyzed, the areas of improvement serve as an internal engagement mechanism to enhance the existing process, procedures, or programs, such as internal or process review sessions.

Implementation Issues To Consider With Human Rights Due Diligence

Several implementation issues for conducting due diligence should be considered carefully, including

  • Clear and appropriate roles and local responsibilities: Because human rights may require cross-functional engagement, clear and appropriate roles, responsibilities, and accountability should be designated.
  • Legal and regulatory issues associated with human rights issues: IPIECA members are recommended to work in close consultation with key functions to properly assess the legal and regulatory context and inform implementation of their due diligence.
  • Handling sensitive information: Implementing due diligence can uncover sensitive, personal, and confidential information that should be handled carefully. Internal procedures for controlling documentation and the exchange of information are recommended.
  • Prioritizing potential issues and effects: Companies should consider prioritizing potential issues and effects to inform their management plans.
  • Engagement and communication: The assessment of potential human rights issues and mitigation measures should involve ongoing engagement and communications with potentially affected and concerned stakeholders.
  • Fit-for-purpose approach: Implementing a due diligence process may vary according to prevailing business processes of the company, size of the project, the prevalence of human rights issues, and the local context of the operations. In all cases, the due diligence process should be ongoing and iterative.

This article, written by Editorial Manager Adam Wilson, contains highlights of paper SPE 164979, “Management Systems Approach to Managing Human Rights Issues,” by Tam Nguyen, Chevron, Bert Fokkema, Shell, Julie Vallat, Total, and Roper Cleland, IPIECA, prepared for the 2013 SPE European HSE Conference and Exhibition, London, 16–18 April. The paper has not been peer reviewed.

For a limited time, the complete paper is free to SPE members at www.spe.org/jpt.

Safety-Management Leading Indicator Results in Unintended Consequences

Published August 8, 2013

A metric based on a corrective-action-classification system initially appeared to be a valuable leading indicator for management purposes. However, after trial applications, it became clear that, when this metric was used to define performance goals, it had unanticipated consequences that cumulatively and insidiously caused more damage than the accidents it was intended to prevent. Category matching is an upgrade of that original metric and eliminates harmful unintended consequences of corrective-action classifications used alone.

Background

Trailing indicators are by far the most common type of safety statistic. Governments, insurance companies, corporations, and essentially everyone who tracks accidents will record the number and type of injuries, plus the money spent on repairs, machinery replacements, wasted time, or other harmful consequences of accidents. Leading indicators are complicated by the fact that some dangerous acts (e.g., touching high-voltage switchgear) will always produce an accident with severe consequences while other dangerous acts (e.g., running a stop sign) might be repeated hundreds of times without causing an accident. In industrial work situations, no scientifically defensible equation exists where X dangerous acts produce Y accidents with Z fatalities.

The component parts of all accidents and the difference between leading and trailing indicators.

As shown in Fig. 1, accidents come in packages with four components. In reverse chronological order, they are (1) consequences, meaning harm (either injury or damage); (2) the accident itself, an unplanned event; (3) an act of people, not intended to produce the accident; and (4) the reason the accident was not anticipated. A broken leg is never an accident. It is an injury and the consequence of an accident. An accident is an unplanned event, and a fall is always an accident regardless of whether it causes injury. The vast majority of accidents cause little or no harm, but confusing an accident with its consequences is a major obstacle to preventing accidents because the target of corrective actions is not clear.

Accident-classification systems tend to describe accident consequences rather than the accident itself. This is important because corrective actions must change what happens before the accident. If a report states that the accident was an eye injury, then a corrective action would prevent the injury by enforcing existing rules about wearing eye protection. That would have no effect at all on preventing the unplanned event that produced the eye injury.

Precisely separating an accident into its component parts, as shown in Fig. 1, is helpful in focusing corrective actions on the right problem. Corrective actions that focus on preventing the accident will be very different from actions focusing on preventing the consequences of that accident.

In the 1980s, a search for meaningful leading indicators led to primitive methods for classifying corrective actions according to their effectiveness. The methods have evolved considerably since then, but the fundamental concepts remain the same. Basic management theory holds that managers change the course of events in three different ways—direct action, supervision, or management.

The original measurement system allocated points for corrective actions given on accident reports. Each stated corrective action was given one, two, or three points if it met definitions of direct action, supervision, or management, respectively. A weighted average of these points reflected the general strength of corrective actions, and two adjustment factors checked if reporting managers were sensitive to near misses and if they actually implemented the corrective ­actions. The result was an index, a number that was directly related to how well managers identified and solved operational problems.

The problems began when upper management set goals or performance standards on the basis of this index. A management type of corrective action is, in effect, a change in the laws the organization adopts for governing itself. For example, one oil company operating internationally set a standard that required managers to produce an index number that could be attained only by producing rule changes for an unrealistically high percentage of all their recordable accidents. Because nearly all accidents are already covered by rules, either internal or external, that requirement produced a redundancy in rules that increasingly became micromanagerial in nature; and, because rules must be enforced to actually be rules, the requirement amounted to force-feeding the bureaucracy that ultimately suffocates any organization.

Rethinking the Situation

Managers can only change acts of people—either what they do themselves or what their subordinates do. They cannot change physics, chemistry, geology, biology, mathematics, weather, geology, or any natural phenomena. They cannot change the properties of oxygen, fuel, or ignition sources, but they can change the acts of people that bring those fire components together. It follows that no corrective action is possible if an accident cannot somehow be expressed as a consequence of an act of people.

There is an important distinction between safety problems and accident-prevention problems. Both problems and corrective actions can be defined in terms of rules. Category 1 problems are the most common. They involve simple mistakes and violations of standard ­advice, general rules, or other ordinary good work practices that a person normally follows but simply overlooked, provided that the event produced only minor harm. Examples are spilled coffee, scraped knuckles, bumped elbows, twisted ankles, and similar minor events.

When such an event produces serious harm, it always means there is another problem to identify. For example, if coffee is spilled on delicate electronic equipment and causes major harm, then the issue is not the safety problem of spilled coffee but the accident-prevention problem of enforcing or generating rules keeping the potentially damaging coffee away from the electronic equipment.

Problems and corrective actions can be defined in terms of rules. Each act-of-people component of an accident must fit into one of these three categories or a corrective action is not possible.

Three categories of problems are identified in Fig. 2. Category 1 involves an individual following well-known, fully understood rules. Category 2 involves applying rules to other people. And Category 3 involves missing or inadequate rules.

Defining Corrective Actions

In the past, the term “corrective action” was defined as a plan or a prearranged schedule of events leading to attaining some objective. That overlooked the fact that an action must be a verb, not a noun. “To plan” is a verb, but “a plan” is a noun; and, a plan is simply a list of actions, not the actions themselves. A plan to launch a special satellite may involve hundreds of people arranging tens of thousands of detailed step sequences, but none of those steps are actual actions until the appropriate orders are issued and carried out. A launch plan is not a launch, and a planned corrective action is not an actual corrective action until an order is given. A better definition of a corrective action, therefore, is “Someone with authority and followup responsibility issuing an order to someone with the knowledge, skills, resources, and desire to carry out the order.” That correctly indicates that an action is a verb (“issuing”), instead of incorrectly declaring that an action is a noun (“a schedule”). A useful mnemonic device is that corrective actions must have COATS, meaning they must be in the same Category as the target problem and be an Order issued by someone with Authority specifying Times and Substantiation.

Game Playing

An ongoing problem with safety metrics is their tendency to become meaningless game playing. This happens when a new safety program announces, “Employees will get a reward (positive or negative) if this number is achieved.” That number might be any of the usual trailing indicators, but, whatever it is, there is always an incentive to stretch definitions or slant reports to achieve the target number, sometimes at the expense of accurately identifying and fixing underlying problems.

The great majority of accidents are already covered by policies, standard procedures, ordinary good work practices, or other rules. Generating new rules on top of existing rules has obvious harmful effects. It is also true that the majority of accidents are simple individual mistakes that can never be totally eliminated, and, as long as they have no realistic chance of causing serious harm, they do not merit management-type corrective actions or rule changes. Early applications of the original index required managers to maintain numbers that could be reached only by devising corrective actions meeting definitions of management, as opposed to supervision or direct action. The game then became managers looking for opportunities to report corrective actions and looking for easy actions that would satisfy requirements for being good management. They were soon compelled to report incidents that really did not need corrective actions and to report corrective actions that did not really have any positive benefits.

Category Matching

Most of the damage caused by using ­corrective-action classifications as a leading indicator can be avoided by simply making sure that both the problem and the corrective action are well-­defined and in the same category. This category-matching technique has a potential for becoming yet another game and, therefore, should not be used as a target for entry-level managers, supervisors, or safety advisors. It is useful as an analytical tool for midlevel or upper managers to improve accident reporting and make corrective actions more effective. It should not be kept secret from anyone, but not everyone needs to be involved in either calculating or using this analysis method, just as they do not need to be involved with computing receivable days, return on investment, turnover rates, or any other management metric.

Applying a corrective action of one category to a problem of a different category always causes harm, but it is often subtle and unnoticed. That point can be explained easily through training sessions based on category matching, but it is important to avoid blaming, too. If an individual violates a rule, whether general or specific, it does not necessarily mean culpability or intentional misbehavior. Most drivers can remember instances of being surprised to discover that they were exceeding a speed limit, had forgotten to turn their lights on, or had unintentionally violated some other rule. This is another reason category matching should be reserved for use by people not directly involved in the accident itself or in preparing the accident report.

This article, written by Editorial Manager Adam Wilson, contains highlights of paper SPE 164961, “Unintended Consequences of a Promising Safety-Management Leading Indicator,” by Carl D. Veley, SPE, vMBA Consultants, prepared for the 2013 SPE European HSE Conference and Exhibition, London, 16–18 April. The paper has not been peer reviewed.

For a limited time, the complete paper is free to SPE members at www.spe.org/jpt.