Most people who work in the oil and gas industry know what a “permit to work” is. A blue permit indicates that it covers “cold” work—work with no potential to create a naked flame, hot surface, spark, or explosion. Having a permit ensures that the job site is safe for the team to do its work, that the team understands the potential risks of the work it is planning to do, and that it agrees to put suitable controls in place.
I spoke recently at the Piper 25 Conference, a 3-day event held in Aberdeen to mark the 25th anniversary of the Piper Alpha disaster that killed 167 people on board the oil platform in the North Sea. On display at the conference was a copy of Cold Work Permit 23434. The tattered paper was found in the accommodation module that was recovered from the seabed. The permit was for the replacement of a relief valve on the B condensate pump. It was this work that was at the heart of the initial release and explosion when the operators tried to start the pump even though it was not ready. The rest, tragically, is history.
It begs an obvious question and a supplementary one: Could something similar happen again and, if so, can we do anything to reduce the chances of it happening?
The oil and gas industry has made huge advances in safety management over the past 25 years. The goal-setting regime, safety cases, and verification schemes have been hugely beneficial.
We have greater collaboration and everyone now talks about safety as being important and most people genuinely believe it. However, the industry is still experiencing too many serious events which, if we are unlucky, could easily result in another tragedy.
We are a global industry in which good practices are shared across our operations. The loss of life in any country has to be as unacceptable as a tragedy on our own doorstep.
Over the past 25 years since Piper Alpha, there have been more than 25 multi-fatality accidents in our industry. In June, two people died in an accident on a gas platform in the Dutch sector of the North Sea. Last year, three died in an explosion in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM) and 11 died in theDeepwater Horizon explosion in the GOM in 2010.
Can we do anything to make these situations less likely? Are we controlling the risks to our people in a joined-up way?
Recommendation 67 of Lord Cullen’s Report on the Piper Alpha disaster called on the industry to institute common systems for alarms and warning lights. Unfortunately, at the time, the industry could not reach this position voluntarily and legislation was needed to create new regulations.
Surely that would not happen today because we have a unified approach with strong, clear leadership across the industry that understands the benefit of common systems and approaches and are not hung up on insisting that only their corporate systems will do. We are happy to agree on common standards for survival training, we have a common system for tracking people traveling offshore, and we have agreed on standards for use of personal locator beacons on helicopter flights.
These are all good. But we are not so good at agreeing to common standards in other areas, such as work control, isolation standards, risk assessment, and safety observation programs. We are good at creating guidelines, but are reluctant to make any hard-and-fast safety rules for the step change “safety club” because few clubs allow membership to choose which rules to follow.
Why not introduce a common permit to work? A common job safety assessment? Common observation programs? Common isolation standards? What a signal it would send to the offshore workforce about our genuine commitment to their safety.
Who Gets the Learning?
More contractor personnel get hurt offshore than operator personnel because there are more of them and fewer work in offices or control rooms. So when an accident happens and a contract worker is injured, you might think that the contractor company has at least as much to learn as anyone else, yet often the company does not hear about the accident straight away, is refused access to participate in the investigation, and does not see the findings unless the operator is faulting the contractor.
The right to be informed of any and all accidents, the right to participate in investigations, and the right to see all findings should be part of the industry’s standard contracting terms. We all have a legal duty to take care of our employees and a legal obligation to cooperate in ensuring the safety of others affected by our activities. So it is not unreasonable to check the work site where our staff may be working, yet many operators take offense at being asked to demonstrate workplace safety.
Leadership Is the Key
So what can we do about this?
Although we can have better systems, more competent people, higher standards, and better training, the key and common ingredient is leadership.
There are hundreds of books on leadership and a thousand different models—each one has merits and many have evidence to support them. So if we cannot get a common idea of leadership, what is the chance of obtaining a common idea of safety leadership?
Leadership shapes culture, culture shapes behavior, and poor behavior is the common factor that can undermine competent people, good design, and strong processes.
It comes down to three basic building blocks.
Things you need to know. A safety leader needs to be informed about what is happening in the business, and be aware of any and all accidents and near misses. To know these things, you need to ask and check—all the time. You need to know the bad news, the concerns, and the complaints and have a culture that does not filter these out.
You also need to know the risks faced by your people, as well as contractors, subcontractors, vendors, and other specialists. You need to know that all of these people are competent. You need to know that risk controls are in place and are effective. And you also need to know that people will do the right thing in an emergency.
Things you need to say and not say. It is said that the primary role of leadership is about setting the tone. It is more than that; it is about repeatedly providing clear and direct messages that reinforce a commitment to safety. Being clear is far from easy—messages need to be repeated, received, credible, and not drowned out or undermined.
Things you need to do and not do. Actions need to match the good words. People see actions—often they do not hear the words. If actions do not match the words, then credibility disappears in an instant. Safety leaders need to be aware that their actions, and sometimes their inactions, are visible and send a bigger message than all the words combined.
| Bob Keiller became chief executive officer (CEO) of the John Wood Group in November 2012. Previously, he was CEO of Wood Group PSN and CEO of Production Services Network before its acquisition by Wood Group. He has also served as chairman of the Offshore Contractors Association, the UK Helicopter Issues Task Group, the Entrepreneurial Exchange, and cochair of Oil and Gas UK. Awarded the Aberdeen Entrepreneur of the Year in 2006 and 2008, he was also named Scottish Businessman of the Year in 2007 and Grampian Industrialist of the Year in 2008. Keiller received a master of engineering degree from Heriot-Watt University and is a chartered engineer. |